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FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS: THE KEYSTONE OF NESTED
COMMONS GOVERNANCE
Blake Hudson*
ABSTRACT
The constitutional structure of a federal system of government can
undermine effective natural capital management across scales, from local
to global. Federal constitutions that grant subnational governments
virtually exclusive regulatory authority over certain types of natural capital
appropriation—such as resources appropriated by private forest
management or other land-use-related economic development activities—
entrench a legally defensible natural capital commons in those
jurisdictions. For example, the same constitution that may legally facilitate
poor forest-management practices by private landowners in the
southeastern United States may complicate international negotiations
related to forest management and climate change. Both the local and
international issues may remain unaddressed because the national
government is not constitutionally empowered to guide subnational policy
formation and therefore may not bind subnational governments to certain
types of international agreements related to private forests. Though there
are around 160 unitary systems of government worldwide, compared to 25
federal systems, approximately 46 percent of the world’s land base is
contained within the boundaries of federal nations. For certain types of
natural capital, like forests, the numbers are even starker. Though federal
systems comprise approximately 13 percent of the world’s governments,
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they maintain control over 70 to 80 percent of the world’s forests—a
resource crucial for combating climate change.
Ultimately, national constitutional incapacity to participate in the
direct regulation of subnational natural capital management in federal
systems may legally entrench a series of natural capital commons, one
nested within another: 1) private individuals may rationally appropriate
natural capital within the state commons in the absence of state
government rules guiding sustainable resource appropriation; 2) state
governments may rationally appropriate natural capital within the national
commons because the national government is not constitutionally
empowered to guide resource appropriation within states; and 3) national
governments may rationally appropriate resources within the global
commons because subnational governments constrain federal system
participation in legally binding global governance of resources. This
Article introduces and describes, at the most basic level, the operation of
nested natural capital commons created by certain federal structures. This
description is necessarily preliminary, establishing a foundation for future
detailed study of both the structure and operation of nested natural capital
commons and how keystone constitutions in federal systems may be
fortified to allow more effective natural capital management across local,
national, and global scales.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL SYSTEM NATURAL CAPITAL
GOVERNANCE: TRAGEDY NOT INEVITABLE, BUT LEGALLY
DEFENSIBLE .................................................................................. 1058
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: FORTIFYING KEYSTONE
CONSTITUTIONS ............................................................................ 1062
KEYSTONE:
1: the wedge-shaped piece at the summit of an arch, regarded as
holding the other pieces in place.1
2: something that is necessary to connect or support a number of other
related things.2
Figure 1

1.
Keystone Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/keystone (last
visited Aug. 7, 2012).
2.
Keystone Definition, COLLINSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/
english/keystone?showCookiePolicy=true (last visited Aug. 7, 2012).
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INTRODUCTION

Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons3 describes the consequences
of “rational” individuals seeking to maximize personal economic benefits
within a closed system of natural resources, or “natural capital.” Without
some coordinating force, arising either internally from the collection of
individuals or externally from an outside authority, each individual’s
exercise of rational self-interest results in overconsumption of the natural
capital and ultimately its complete and tragic elimination from the system.
The Tragedy of the Commons is one of the most cited policy articles of our
time4 and has become one of the primary drivers of environmental policy.
Its theoretical construct has been applied to everything from traditional
natural resources to social constructs like the presidential primary system.5
Yet scholars have failed to apply the theory to the system of government
most likely to parallel, and indeed legally entrench, the natural capital
commons described by Hardin—the federal system of government.
Within federal systems, numerous subnational governments and private
entities seek to maximize individual benefits, such as economic growth
through land development and resource extraction activities, within the
closed systems of natural capital defined by governmental boundaries. If
subnational entities refuse to self-coordinate and if a higher level of
government does not maintain the constitutional authority to coordinate
subnational action, then each government’s individualized “rationality”6
may result in overconsumption of natural capital and ultimately its
complete and tragic elimination from both subnational resource systems
and the aggregate of subnational systems constituting the national and
global natural capital systems. Such is the case in the United States, where
the U.S. federal government has no direct and limited indirect7 recognized
constitutional authority over land use planning and regulation within the

3.
4.

Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
KARLSON “CHARLIE” HARGROVES & MICHAEL H. SMITH, THE NATURAL ADVANTAGE OF
NATIONS: BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, INNOVATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 178
(2005).
5.
Brigham Daniels, Governing the Presidential Nomination Commons, 84 TUL. L. REV. 899
(2010).
6.
“Rational” here is used to simply describe governments or individuals who make policy and
natural capital appropriation decisions based primarily on short-term economic costs and benefits
within their own jurisdictional or property boundaries, much like Hardin’s herders on the commons. It
is not invoked to debate or explore the nuances of behavioral economics or whether under all
circumstances individuals or governments necessarily behave “rationally.” Indeed, this Article focuses
on the circumstances in which they do behave in this manner, a common occurrence in the land
development context, and does not make a normative claim that they always do so.
7.
See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
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nearly 88,000 subnational government jurisdictions within its borders.8 As
a result, the federal government arguably lacks constitutional authority to
coordinate a vast abundance of individualized subnational rationality in the
context of private land development and landed resource extraction
activities, such as private forest management. In turn, states often decline to
coordinate the land use activities of local governments and private property
owners despite possessing the constitutional authority to do so. These states
maintain lax land use standards, most often with a view toward promoting
economic development and the replacement of natural capital with humanmade capital.9
Ultimately, the lack of coordinating authority at the national level
within a federal system of government has the potential to legally entrench
a natural capital commons within national and state boundaries.
Importantly, these domestic constitutional constraints also may entrench a
natural capital commons at the global level.10 Federal constitutions that
grant subnational governments virtually exclusive regulatory authority over
certain subject matters constrain national governments during international
negotiations—a national government that cannot constitutionally bind
subnational governments to an international agreement cannot freely
arrange its international obligations. Indeed, the international governance
system itself operates like a federal system in which exclusive regulatory
authority resides in subnational units because no hegemonic external
authority exists to prescribe and enforce rules. As a result, global
governance depends entirely upon rules of operation established by and
acquiesced to by participating nations. Those rules may not materialize in
the most efficacious form if national governments in federal systems
cannot legally bind subnational governments domestically to ensure
implementation of international agreements.
The case of private forest management in the U.S. provides a tangible
example of how a single constitution may entrench a natural capital
commons on local, national, and global scales. Forests are perhaps the

8.
STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TODAY 89 (14th ed.
2009); see also infra notes 163–165 and accompanying text.
9.
Edella Schlager & William Blomquist, Water Resources: The Southwestern United States, in
PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS 133,
157 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001). Indeed, “[f]ederal, state, and local rules and organizations on the
public-sector side are intensely articulated with land-use development . . . decisions driven largely by
private-sector concerns.” Id.
10.
This is particularly important since scholars have argued that “[p]art of the reason the
commons thinking of the past needs revisiting is that the scale of commons issues has expanded
dramatically. Several of the most important commons problems are now truly global in scale.” Joanna
Burger et al., Common-Pool Resources and Commons Institutions, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A
FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS 1, 6 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001).
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quintessential scalar resource.11 On local scales, forests provide timber
resources, watershed protection,12 air quality benefits, and gains in energy
efficiency, while on global scales they sequester large amounts of
greenhouse gases that would otherwise exacerbate climate change.13
Pursuant to their reserved constitutional power over land use regulation,
states currently maintain virtually exclusive regulatory authority over the
60% of U.S. forests in private ownership.14 Some states maintain robust
standards to achieve sustainable forest management protections, while a
number of other states, particularly in the southeast, maintain only
voluntary forest management standards that are some of the least rigorous
in the world—even less stringent than many developing countries.15 These
poor standards can lead to a variety of environmental harms, especially as
forests face increased population and land development pressures in the
future.16
The same Constitution that allows southeastern states to exercise
“rationality” in maintaining oftentimes poor forest management standards
on local scales also limits the United States’ ability to fully engage in
certain international negotiations. For example, because the federal
government has no recognized authority to intervene in subnational
regulation of private forest management, the U.S. may be prohibited from
participating in a climate change agreement dictating certain types of
forest-management activities on global scales.17 The U.S.’s inability to
11.
Scholars have argued that “[t]he traditional law of state responsibility must be expanded to
include internal state duties toward new common property . . . To this end, forests must be
recharacterized from exclusive to shared resources. The scientific case for recognizing forests as shared
resources rests on their regional and global functions.” A. Dan Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty Versus
Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest
Management, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 37, 46–47 (1997).
12.
See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
13.
ORAN R. YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS 6 (2009).
14.
As scholars note, “[u]nder the US Constitution, the federal government has limited authority
and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for the states. Forestland management and use was one
such reserved power.” Gerald A. Rose et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in the US, in THE
POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER 238, 239 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer &
Doris Capistrano eds., 2005).
15.
Jacek P. Siry et al., Global Forest Ownership: Implications for Forest Production,
Management, and Protection 3, XIII World Forestry Congress Paper (2009), available at
http://www.pefc.org/images/stories/documents/external/global_forest_ownership_FD.pdf (last visited
Apr. 25, 2011). This is not to say, however, that developing countries with greater standards on paper
manage forests better in fact, as enforcement capacity and overall efficacy of the rule of law impact the
translation of law into results on the ground.
16.
See Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees,
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363, 365–66 (2011).
17.
See generally id. Though prescriptive dictates for forests are not on the table currently in
international negotiations, the trajectory of international regimes is anything but stable, as evidenced by
the devolution of the Kyoto regime into the current regional, transnational, and voluntary arrangements
rather than binding emissions targets. As climate change impacts become more severe and in the face of
rising populations, the winds of global forest governance could once against shift toward more robust
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implement such a treaty regarding a majority of the forests within its
borders would render its participation virtually meaningless. As a result of
these constitutional constraints, rational private foresters can freely
appropriate forest resources from the state natural capital commons,
rational states facilitate unchecked forest capital appropriation from the
national natural capital commons, and rational nations may remain
unchecked in appropriation of forest capital from the global natural capital
commons.
Ultimately, the governance structure established by a federal
constitution is crucial to determining whether a state, national, and global
natural capital commons will be legally entrenched across the scale of
federal system geopolitical boundaries. Federal constitutions act as a
keystone for connecting these commons, “nested” one within another, and
for supporting effective natural capital management across scales. This
Article seeks to analyze the implications of constitutionally entrenched
nested natural capital commons in order to better understand how federal
systems of government can avoid rushing toward tragic overconsumption
of natural resources on local and national scales, and also how they can
avoid doing so on a global scale within the ultimate federal system—the
international community. This examination of federal nested commons,
previously overlooked by scholars, is only an introduction to some of the
more notable features of federal constitutional impacts on resource
governance across scales. Hopefully the examination will lead to further
research into the nuances of federal nested commons, their implications for
resource governance across scales, and better overall management of
natural capital within federal systems.18
Part II will define “commons” and its constituent elements and discuss
the various solutions available, yet individually insufficient, to address
commons tragedies. Next, Part II will briefly describe the natural capital
commons that are the focus of this Article. It will further explain how
federal systems of government may entrench a legally protected natural
capital commons and how that commons is actually a nested set of
commons—a subnational commons within a national commons within the
global commons. In addition, Part II will describe how a federal nation’s
constitutional structure is crucial to avoiding natural capital commons
tragedies not only within federal nations on both local and national scales,
worldwide usage of forests to both combat climate change and provide a variety of other ecosystem
services crucial to society. Ultimately, all options should be left on the table in the context of this
complex and increasingly menacing global environmental threat.
18.
Indeed, the author is currently co-author on a forthcoming article further exploring the
concepts presented here. See Blake Hudson and Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to
Commons Problems: Nested Governance Commons and Climate Change, 64 HASTINGS L.J.
(forthcoming 2012).
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but also globally as nations attempt to negotiate rules guiding the global
governance of natural capital. Part III undertakes for the first time an
analysis of the basic operation of nested natural capital commons that arise
as a result of certain federal constitutional structures. Part IV explores how
these nested commons need not necessarily result in tragedy for the natural
capital within a federal system, but in reality the tragedy remains a distinct,
legally defensible possibility—and indeed is occurring under a variety of
circumstances across natural capital management scales. Part V briefly
concludes with a discussion of how keystone constitutions in federal
systems may be fortified to facilitate more effective natural capital resource
governance.
II. THE FEDERALIZATION OF NATURAL CAPITAL COMMONS AND THE
ROLE OF KEYSTONE CONSTITUTIONS
A. Commons
Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons19 describes a pasture open to
any and all herders of cattle, each of whom maintains the right to graze in
the pasture. This open allocation of rights renders the pasture a
“commons,” and the grass present upon it a “commons resource.” Each
herder makes a rational choice upon entering the pasture to maximize
personal economic gain by continually adding cattle to the herder’s
respective herd. Though each herder gains the full benefit of each
additional cow, the negative cost of incremental overgrazing of the grass
resource is spread among all herders on the commons. As a result, each
herder undertakes a simple, short-term cost-benefit analysis and determines
that it is always in the herder’s best interest to add more cattle since
individual returns invariably outweigh individual costs. Eventually, each
herder’s individual decision to add additional cattle to the herd results in
overconsumption and depletion of the grass resource, leading to its ultimate
destruction.
Commons scholars have recognized a wide and ever-expanding variety
of resources that may be deemed commons in nature and which may be
subject to tragedies of overuse and degradation. Commons analysis has
been applied not only to “traditional” natural resources, such as fisheries,
forests, groundwater aquifers, and the atmosphere, but also to a variety of
“new commons” in the form of medical care,20 parking spaces, sidewalk

19.
20.

Hardin, supra note 3.
Michael Gochfeld, Joanna Burger, & Bernard D. Goldstein, Medical Care as a Commons, in
PROTECTING THE COMMONS, supra note 9, at 253.
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vending, knowledge, government budgets, silence, e-mail inboxes, and
even presidential primaries.21
Though the categories of resources to which commons analysis may be
applied continue to expand, commons scholars have settled on two key
elements that define commons resources: depletability and nonexcludability. Noted commons scholars Keohane and Ostrom characterize
commons resources as “depletable natural or human-made resources from
which potential beneficiaries are difficult to exclude,”22 while Oran Young
similarly describes them as resources “used by a group of appropriators that
is both non-excludable and depletable.”23 Stated slightly differently,
commons resources are “natural or human-made resources in which (a)
exclusion is non-trivial (but not necessarily impossible) and (b) yield is
subtractable.”24 To put these terms in context, the grass resource consumed
by one herder is no longer available to others (depletable), and it is very
difficult to exclude any one herder from consuming the resource (nonexcludable).
A variety of other terms are utilized when undertaking commons
analysis. The corpus of resources that make up the commons is known as a
“resource system.”25 A resource system is comprised of “resource units,”
defined as “what individuals appropriate or use from resource systems.”26
21.

Daniels, supra note 5, at 907. Professor Daniels has noted that
[m]ost natural resources of significant size have traits of commons resources including
groundwater aquifers, beaches, air sheds, and the polar ice caps, to name a few. Much of our
developed environment also exhibits traits of commons resources, such as parking spots and
sidewalk vending. Over the past decade, scholars devoted to an area often referred to as
“new commons” have identified much less intuitive things that exhibit the traits of commons
resources including knowledge, government budgets, silence, and e-mail inboxes. New
commons resources are new in one of two respects. First, they might be considered new in
that, like an e-mail inbox, they are a fairly recent invention. Second, they might be familiar
but only recently categorized as a commons resource, as in the case of silence or knowledge.
Id. This Article argues that the very system of government meant to address commons concerns may
itself, when federal in kind, constitute another “new commons” worthy of study.
22.
Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL
INTERDEPENDENCE 1, 13 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995). Duncan Snidal asserts that
commons analysis “focuses on the provision and appropriation of goods that are not joint in
consumption (like private goods) but where exclusion is difficult (like public goods). Standard cases are
natural resources, like forests or water, where the quantity available is less than the desired consumption
of potential appropriators.” Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity
and Institutions, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE, supra, at 50.
23.
Oran R. Young, Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships, in LOCAL
COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 22, at 29.
24.
Steven Hackett, Dean Dudley & James Walker, Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict
Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL
INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 22, at 95.
25.
Ostrom cites fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, irrigation canals, bridges,
parking garages, mainframe computers, streams, lakes, oceans, and other bodies of water as examples
of “resource systems.” ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (1990).
26.
Id.
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The process of withdrawing resource units from a resource system is called
“appropriation,” and those who withdraw resource units from the system
are called “appropriators.”27 When more than one appropriator extracts
commons resource units from a resource system—as do the herders in
Hardin’s example—they are called “co-appropriators.”28 Co-appropriators
are “tied together in a lattice of interdependence” so long as they continue
to share the commons.29 Finally, “providers” arrange for the provision of a
commons resource, and “producers” are any entities that maintain and
ensure the long-term viability of the resource system.30
Of particular importance for the concepts of scale presented in this
Article, resource units “are not subject to joint use or appropriation,”31
meaning that appropriators can exclude other appropriators from the
resource unit itself. Rather, the non-excludability requirement for a
commons resource is met because it is exceedingly difficult to exclude
other appropriators from the resource system. So whether a resource is in
fact part of a commons is largely a matter of scale, and depends upon how
one defines both the resource unit and the resource system. For the
purposes of this Article, for example, a resource unit may be defined by
private property, state, or national geopolitical boundaries, and the resource
system is the higher-level geopolitical jurisdiction that contains those
respective resource units.
Hardin’s pastoral commons illustrates commons terminology in a fairly
straightforward manner. Hardin’s pasture is a resource system, and the
immediately consumable portion of grass appropriated by each herder is a
resource unit. Herders who graze their cattle are appropriators, and the
process of grazing is an appropriation of grass resource units—in this way
multiple grazing herders may be called co-appropriators. In turn, coappropriating herders are the providers of a specific pastoral resource
system, as they facilitate provision of the commons resource. Even so, the
herders may also allow “nonproviding” appropriators from surrounding
areas to come to their pasture and extract resources for a time.32 If the coappropriating herders establish a set of rules to ensure the long-term
sustainability of the pasture, then they are also the producers of the

27.
Id. Ostrom gives numerous examples of appropriators, such as herders, fishers, irrigators,
commuters, and “anyone else who appropriates resource units from some type of resource system.” Id.
at 31.
28.
Id. at 38.
29.
Id.
30.
Id. at 41.
31.
Id. at 31.
32.
Though appropriators and providers may certainly be the same party, appropriators may also
exist outside a group of providers. One appropriator may appropriate a commons resource, but that
resource may be provided by a limited set of appropriators.
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resource system. If an external authority (e.g., a government) mandates
rules for long-term viability of the herder’s pastoral resource system, then
the external authority may be considered the producer.
These terms guide application of commons analysis to commons
resources. Their application assists in determining whether a resource is
part of a commons in the first instance, whether solutions to commons
problems are effective, and how those solutions might be adjusted to
provide better management of commons resources.
B. Commons Solutions: No Silver Bullet
Solutions aimed at preventing tragic over-appropriation of both
traditional and new commons resources may take a variety of forms,
ranging from government regulation on one end of the spectrum to
privatization on the other. For example, an external authority may mandate
rules for dividing appropriation of the resource among the herders and
regulating “what, where, when, and how” appropriation occurs. In the
alternative, an external authority might establish rules for fencing the
commons and allocating property rights so that each herder has a privatized
incentive to preserve the grass resource on the herder’s portion of property.
Of course, a wide range of combined government regulation and private
property rights approaches exist between the two ends of the spectrum.
Indeed, this is the case in the U.S., as private property rights are in constant
tension with government regulation of the environment.
Some scholars, such as Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, have argued that
neither regulation nor privatization is a necessary component of responsible
commons management. Ostrom posits a third option that does not arise
from an external source like the government or the market, but rather
internally from among the herders themselves. Ostrom argues,
One set of advocates presumes that a central authority must assume
continuing responsibility to make unitary decisions for a particular
resource. The other presumes that a central authority should parcel
out ownership rights to the resource and then allow individuals to
pursue their own self-interests within a set of well-defined property
rights. Both centralization advocates and privatization advocates
accept as a central tenet that institutional change must come from
outside and be imposed on the individuals affected. Despite sharing
a faith in the necessity and efficacy of “the state” to change
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institutions so as to increase efficiency, the institutional changes
they recommend could hardly be further apart.33
Ostrom posits that both of these extremes are “too sweeping in their
claims,” arguing that “the capacity of individuals to extricate themselves
from various types of dilemma situations varies from situation to
situation.”34 Stated in more stark terms, Ostrom argues that “[i]nstead of
presuming that some individuals are incompetent, evil, or irrational, and
others are omniscient, I presume that individuals have very similar limited
capabilities to reason and figure out the structure of complex
environments,” and that more focused study should be undertaken to
ascertain the resource management problems individuals face and which
circumstances hinder or help them.35 Indeed, the lynchpin of Ostrom’s
work leading to her 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences is her robust
insight into the circumstances36 under which groups of individuals have
engaged in successful collective action to sustainably manage resources in
the absence of private property rights or governmental regulatory
intervention.37

33.

OSTROM, supra note 25, at 14. Furthermore, Ostrom argues that,
[a]n assertion that central regulation is necessary tells us nothing about the way a central
agency should be constituted, what authority it should have, how the limits on its authority
should be maintained, how it will obtain information, or how its agents should be selected,
motivated to do their work, and have their performances monitored and rewarded or
sanctioned. An assertion that the imposition of private property rights is necessary tells us
nothing about how that bundle of rights is to be defined, how the various attributes of the
goods involved will be measured, who will pay for the costs of excluding nonowners from
access, how conflicts over rights will be adjudicated, or how the residual interests of the
right-holders in the resource system itself will be organized.
Id. at 22.
34.
Id. at 14.
35.
Id. at 25.
36.
These circumstances are ones that include: 1) clearly defined boundaries of both the resource
system and the parties who may appropriate resources; 2) appropriation and provision rules that match
(or are “congruent” with) local conditions, meaning rules restricting time, place, technology, and
quantity of resource units that may be appropriated are related to those conditions; 3) most all
appropriators have collective choice rights allowing them to participate in modifying operational rules;
4) monitors of rules and behavior are accountable to appropriators or are appropriators themselves; 5)
appropriators who violate rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions; 6) adequate conflictresolution mechanisms that are low-cost and may be accessed quickly, 7) the rights of appropriators to
devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities; and 8)
appropriative, monitoring, enforcement, and conflict resolution activities are organized in multiple
layers of nested enterprises. Id. at 90.
37.
Such groups include communities managing meadows and forests in Torbel, Switzerland and
Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan, as well as communities managing irrigation systems
in Valencia, Murica and Orihuela, and Alicante, Spain and in the Philippines. See OSTROM, supra note
25, at 61–88. Importantly, many of Ostrom’s design principles “appear relevant to resolve problems of
international cooperation as well as those at a strictly local level.” Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 22, at
2.

3 HUDSON 1007-1065 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

9/4/2012 10:30 AM

Federal Constitutions

1019

Regardless of whether purported commons solutions arise from
external governments or markets, or from internal arrangements among
individuals, commons resources remain subject to potential tragedy due to
the imperfect and individually deficient nature of the various solutions. In
practical reality, “neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in
enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural
resource systems.”38 Both market-driven privatization and governmentdriven regulation, due to their nature as external forces on appropriators,
result in a variety of negative externalities39 that remain even in the
presence of the purported solution.40 Furthermore, Ostrom’s successful
collective action model has its own imperfection, though it is unrelated to
the model itself. Rather, this imperfection might best be described as an
imperfection of scale—in practice Ostrom’s model simply occurs too
infrequently on large resource management scales to capture the vast
majority of the world’s natural capital.41
Invoking Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan,42 Ostrom challenges government
regulation (“Leviathan”) as the “only way” to resolve commons tragedies,
as numerous scholars have argued.43 The presumption that an “external
Leviathan” is necessary to address commons problems has led scholars to
recommend that central governments control most natural resource
management within nations, or “[t]he central authority will decide who can
use the meadow, when they can use it, and how many animals can be
grazed.”44 But this approach often fails because central authorities do not
maintain sufficient information to estimate the carrying capacity of
commons resources or to design the appropriate penalties to induce
behavioral change. Crafting resource management policies based on
inadequate information results in ineffective policies and continued
resource degradation, especially because central governments are often
incapable of providing sufficient monitoring and enforcement.45 Indeed,
central government deficiencies are the primary drivers for decentralized
resource governance in federal systems, to harness the ability of those
closer to the resources to act upon better information regarding resource
appropriation and management.
Other scholars have argued that stringent imposition of private property
rights is the “only way” to prevent commons tragedies—a proposition that
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

OSTROM, supra note 25, at 1.
HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 432–39 (3d ed. 1992).
See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (2009 ed.).
OSTROM, supra note 25, at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 17.
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Ostrom also challenges.46 This approach “would divide the meadow in half
and assign half of the meadow to one herder and the other half to the
second herder.”47 As Ostrom notes, however, “each herder will be playing a
game against nature in a smaller terrain, rather than a game against another
player in a larger terrain.”48 Accordingly, as further analyzed in Part III.A.
below, individuals pit themselves against natural capital on private
properties, appropriating it and replacing it with human-made capital,49
even if they are now able to exclude other appropriators from the resource
unit contained on the property. In other words, the private property may
still operate as a commons with regard to the natural capital present upon it.
In addition, various market failures, such as imperfect information, “freeriders,” transaction costs, collective action problems, and other failures to
internalize externalities lead to continued environmental destruction even
in the presence of a private property rights system.50
What of internal arrangements amongst herders outside the context of
governmental regulation or private property rights? Ostrom is correct that
herders are not inevitably locked into a tragic fate and that many case
studies demonstrate successful collective action to protect resources in the
absence of private property rights or government regulation. Certainly the
great value of Ostrom’s work is that it provides a firm foundation for
exploring how her models may be scaled up to achieve successful resource
management on much larger scales. Nonetheless, her examples currently
remain a distinct minority of cases.51
Until Ostrom’s analysis can be infused more broadly into current
systems of resource governance and management, an imperfect system for
managing natural capital commons remains. This system balances
governmental regulation with private property rights and markets, but
because that balance has not yet been sufficiently struck, much of the
world’s natural capital remains in an increasingly tragic plight. The
continued overexploitation of natural capital commons resources
demonstrates as much—whether it is world fisheries, an atmosphere
46.
Id. at 12.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Human-made capital includes “factories, buildings, tools, and other physical artifacts usually
associated with the term ‘capital.’” Robert Costanza & Herman E. Daly, Natural Capital and
Sustainable Development, 6 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 37, 38 (1992).
50.
Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78
U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 538 (2007); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE COMMON GOOD (2003); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993).
51.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text. As observed by scholars, “[t]he real-world
commons problems that Ostrom studies usually involve repeated interactions among a relatively small
number of players who are able to develop subtle institutions for monitoring and enforcing a degree of
cooperation.” Theodore Bergstrom, The Uncommon Insight of Elinor Ostrom, 112 SCANDINAVIAN J.
ECON. 245, 246 (2010).
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increasingly filled with greenhouse gases, Amazonian rainforests, or other
landed natural capital increasingly extracted or replaced by human-made
capital due to economic development pressures. The next Part addresses the
last circumstance, providing background on landed natural capital
commons and how they are implicated by the various purported solutions
to commons tragedies.
C. Natural Capital Commons
We must learn to recognize the true value of nature—both in an
economic sense and in the richness it provides to our lives in ways
much more difficult to put numbers on. Above all, protection of
these assets can no longer be seen as an optional extra, to be
considered once more pressing concerns such as wealth creation or
national security have been dealt with . . . healthy ecosystems are
central to the aspirations of humankind.52
Though “[s]ocieties invest a great deal of effort in monitoring and
cultivating their physical, financial, and human capital . . . they typically
pay scant attention to their natural capital . . . .”53 The term “natural capital”
includes “all the familiar resources used by humankind: water, minerals,
oil, trees, fish, soil, air,” and other natural resources, but also includes
ecological systems, such as “grasslands, savannas, wetlands, estuaries,
oceans, coral reefs, riparian corridors, tundras, and rainforests.”54 Natural
capital has two primary components: stocks of non-renewable natural
resources, such as fossil fuels and minerals, and renewable natural
resources in the form of ecosystems and the services they provide.55
Costanza and Daly assert that natural capital is based upon:
a more functional definition of capital, as “a stock that yields a
flow of valuable goods or services into the future.” . . . [A] stock or
population of trees or fish provides a flow or annual yield of new
52.
DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 11 (4th ed.
2010) (citing MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: NATURAL ASSETS
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 5, 16–22 (2005)).
53.
Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through Ecosystem Service Districts, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 334 (2001).
54.
PAUL HAWKEN, AMORY LOVINS & L. HUNTER LOVINS, NATURAL CAPITALISM: CREATING
THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 2 (1999).
55.
Heal, supra note 53, at 334 n.1. These ecosystem services include “the production of goods
(such as seafood and timber), life support processes (such as pollination, flood control, and water
purification), and life-fulfilling conditions (such as beauty and serenity), as well as the conservation of
options for the future (such as genetic diversity).” Id. at 334. Other scholars assert that the natural
resources that comprise natural capital are “material that has economic or social value when extracted
from its natural state.” SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (1998).
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trees or fish, a flow that can be sustainable year after year. The
sustainable flow is “natural income”; the stock that yields the
sustainable flow is “natural capital.” Natural capital may also
provide services such as recycling waste materials, or water
catchment and erosion control, which are also counted as natural
income. Since the flow of services from ecosystems requires that
they function as whole systems, the structure and diversity of the
system is an important component in natural capital.56
Scholars have increasingly recognized the value of the services
provided by natural capital, as evidenced by the growing body of
scholarship on ecosystem services. These scholars seek to bring into focus
the needed internalization of economic externalities long excluded from
market-based decision-making regarding the management and use of
natural resources.57 Researchers estimate natural capital stock and
ecosystem service values worldwide to be, at a minimum, an average of
$33 trillion per year.58 This value is nearly twice the value of the combined
gross national product of countries across the globe, which equals $18
trillion per year. Unfortunately, the tremendous value of natural capital and
ecosystem services is almost entirely excluded from the market. This
exclusion is one of the most significant disconnects between the economic
and environmental systems upon which we depend. As scholars note,
[j]ust because these services have no market price [ ] does not
mean that they are without value. Quite the opposite. One cannot

56.
Costanza, supra note 49, at 38. In addition, “natural capital” and “natural income” are
“aggregates of natural resources in their separate stock and flow dimensions . . . .” Id.
57.
See James Salzman, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law, in MANAGING
HUMAN DOMINATED ECOSYSTEMS 77 (Victoria Hollowell ed., 2001); James Salzman, Barton H.
Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001); James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from
the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2005); James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of
Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133 (2006). Take endangered species as an example.
Scholars have argued that “[t]here is significant scientific evidence that many endangered or threatened
species that possess little commercial value perform critical ‘ecosystem services’ such as decomposing
organic matter, renewing soil, mitigating floods, purifying air and water, or partially stabilizing climatic
variation.” Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species Under the
Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits Over Whether the Regulated Activity Is Private
Commercial Development or the Taking of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 989–90 (2004)
(citing John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots Legislation,
52 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1164–65 (2001)).
58.
Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital,
387 NATURE 253, 259 (1997). The ecosystem services included in the estimate are atmospheric gas
regulation, climate regulation, ecosystem disturbance regulation, water regulation, water supply, erosion
control and sediment retention, soil formation, nutrient cycling, waste treatment, pollination, biological
process regulation, habitat refuge, food production, raw materials, genetic resources, recreation, and
cultural values. Id. at 254.

3 HUDSON 1007-1065 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

9/4/2012 10:30 AM

Federal Constitutions

1023

begin to understand flood control, for example, without realizing
the impact of widespread wetland destruction on the ecosystem
service of water retention; nor can one understand water quality
without recognizing how development in forested watersheds
degrades the service of water purification. The costs from
degradation of these services are high, and suffered in rich and
poor countries alike.59
Despite increased recognition of human dependence on the services
provided by natural capital, nearly two-thirds of valuable ecosystem
services worldwide are in decline, and “the benefits reaped from our
engineering of the planet have been achieved by running down natural
capital assets.”60 A root cause of this decline is that “with rare exception,
local, state, and national governments simply do not consider ecosystems
as valuable providers of services. Without explicit comparisons between
natural and built provision of services, we will continue to miss
opportunities where reliance on natural capital provides the lowest cost
services for human welfare.”61 Unfortunately, the metrics of economic
growth established by society demonstrate that society all too often values
the provision and maintenance of human-made capital at the expense of
natural capital. As a result, we must not only compare the relative services
that human or natural capital can provide, but must also analyze the
institutional flaws responsible for the current balance of human-made and
natural capital management and how those flaws can be rectified.
Commons analysis provides a mechanism for exploring those flaws and
remedies and specifically establishes a framework for assessing how the
federal form of governance may exacerbate natural capital commons
tragedies.
Applying commons analysis to natural capital resources is nothing
new, as those resources have long been considered part of traditional
commons—any forest, fishery or groundwater aquifer that is not privatized
or regulated by a government authority, but that is open to appropriation by
non-excludable appropriators may be subject to tragic overconsumption.
However, current commons and environmental scholarship related to
natural capital is incomplete. For example, some scholars and policymakers seem to presume that both the commons and the tragedy of
overconsumption disappear once a forest is privatized or regulated. Yet
natural capital subject to both privatization and regulation within a federal
system of government may remain in a commons state and can therefore be
59.
HUNTER, supra note 52, at 11.
60.
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: NATURAL ASSETS
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 5, quoted in HUNTER, supra note 52, at 11.
61.
Heal, supra note 53, at 334.
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considered a “new commons” to which commons analysis can and should
be applied.
Recent research demonstrates, for example, that natural capital on
private lands constitutes a “new commons” resource in the form of
“privatized commons resources.”62 As described in greater detail in Part
III.A. below, natural capital on private lands is depletable, and in the
absence of government regulation it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to exclude any private property owner from appropriating
natural capital and replacing it with human-made capital or from
transferring property to another appropriator who would do the same. Thus,
natural capital on private lands meets the definition of a commons resource.
The same may be said about the other end of the spectrum—
government regulation. This is especially the case when a government’s
institutional structure is designed in a way that facilitates the ability of
subnational governments to appropriate natural capital resources with
unchecked rationality. When a system of government constitutionally
grants exclusive control over natural capital appropriation to the hundreds
and oftentimes thousands of subnational governments within its borders,
that system legally entrenches a commons—the nation’s natural capital is
depletable and it becomes extremely difficult, if not legally impossible,63 to
exclude individual subnational governments from appropriating that natural
capital (or allowing that appropriation) through their individual bodies of
land use law. Difficulty of exclusion is exacerbated when governments
establish economic policies that align incentives with, and proactively
encourage, the replacement of natural capital with built, human-made
capital.
Not only do governments affirmatively encourage the replacement of
natural capital with human-made capital for the sake of economic
development activities, but even when governments act to protect the
environment their approaches passively devalue natural capital. As noted
by scholars, “[s]pecialized governmental institutions do, of course, pay
attention to some [ecosystem] services, but their focus is primarily on the
provision of services through modification of the landscape or construction
of specialized facilities—that is, through ‘built structures.’”64 Examples
would be building dams and levees to control flooding, rather than
restoring or conserving wetlands, or building water purification plants

62.
Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation
Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 375 (2011).
63.
That is, legally impossible as long as the constitutional structure allows exclusive subnational
control over natural capital appropriation.
64.
Heal et al., supra note 53, at 334.
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rather than protecting and restoring forested watersheds that provide the
same water purification benefits.65
When governmental policies promote the replacement of natural capital
with human-made capital in the name of economic development and the
harnessing of human-made capital to provide environmental benefits that
could otherwise be naturally provided, the government fails to act as a
commons solution or to fundamentally change the commons character of
the resources. It is very much like a government requiring herders to pay
taxes for their use of the pasture, or providing herders with a subsidized
alternative food source in the form of canned and processed cattle food, or
mandating that the herders use a particular type of corralling method to
prevent grazing deaths, but then allowing the herders to appropriate natural
capital however they see fit. This attribute may be no different in any
system of government. As introduced in the next Subpart, however, a
federal system of government not only fails to act as a solution for natural
capital commons, but may also legally entrench and protect a commons by
providing numerous subnational governments virtually exclusive authority
to set rules for natural resource appropriation.
D. Federal Systems May Legally Entrench a Nested Natural Capital
Commons
As discussed, some federal systems of government maintain
constitutional structures that create nested natural capital commons across
local, national, and global scales. Commons scholars have previously noted
that “[p]roperty rights systems, and governance systems more generally,
tend to be nested in space ranging from the shared properties of individual
families, to the shared resources of communities of families or local
governments, to much larger regional and national governmental
jurisdictions.”66 Even though scholars have spent a great deal of time
discussing mechanisms for addressing problems associated with commons
present within these nested constructs, they have failed to adequately assess
situations where the governmental solution itself becomes the commons.
As noted, a system of private property rights can take on the characteristics
of a commons when natural capital on private lands is appropriated by
economic development activities.67 So too can federal systems of
government when subnational governments refuse to exercise their
65.
Id. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text; Alice Kenny, Ecosystem Services in the
MARKETPLACE
(Feb.
10,
2006),
New
York
City
Watershed,
ECOSYSTEM
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=4130&section=home
&eod=1.
66.
Burger et al., supra note 10, at 7.
67.
Hudson, supra note 62.
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constitutional authority to intervene in natural capital appropriation on
private lands and the national government lacks the constitutional authority
to do so in their stead. At each level of governance federal systems may
thus create a commons, one nested within another, as private actors
appropriate natural capital in an unchecked manner from the state
commons, states allow natural capital appropriation in an unchecked
manner from the national commons, and nations appropriate natural capital
in an unchecked manner from the global commons.
In fact, federal systems of government provide an ideal case study for
addressing natural capital commons problems across scales and how the
balance of government, private property, and collective action approaches
to managing commons should be adjusted to achieve more effective
management. Keohane and Ostrom note that the situations faced by actors
within a commons, “whether at a local or international level, create[] strong
similarities among problems, even at very different scales. That is, the
similarities between local [commons] problems and [commons] problems
involving international regimes are sufficiently great that we can learn a
good deal from treating them within a comparable framework.”68 Thus the
operation of a federally entrenched natural capital commons on local scales
can provide valuable insights into its operation at national and global
scales.
As a descriptive matter, federal systems of government resemble
Hardin’s pasture of rational herders more than perhaps any other form of
governance. Hardin’s pasture is divided among numerous rational herders
making individualized choices about how to appropriate the natural capital
over which they have control. Similarly, federal systems are divided among
perhaps thousands of subnational governments who make rational,
individualized choices regarding the appropriation of natural capital.
Through their disparate management rules and regulatory mechanisms
these subnational governments dictate appropriation of the natural capital
that constitutes the “environment” contained within national boundaries—
natural capital distributed with absolute disregard for the numerous
subnational geopolitical boundaries segmenting the nation.69 The United
States, for example, contains nearly 88,000 separate governmental units.70
68.
Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 22, at 11. Even so, we must remain aware of the “dangers of
simplistic reasoning. Macro-scale systems are not merely small-scale systems writ large. Nor are microscale systems mere microcosms of large-scale systems. It follows that we cannot simply assume that the
mechanisms at work at the two levels are the same . . . .” Young, supra note 23, at 42. Even so, “there is
considerable scope for cross-fertilization among studies of social phenomena conducted at different
scales.” Id.
69.
See generally, K. Divakaran Prathapan & Priyadarsanan Dharma Rajan, Commentary,
Biological Diversity: A Common Heritage, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 15 (2011), available at
http://globaljusticeecology.org/files/biodiversity.pdf.
70.
SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 8.
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While this degree of decentralized governance certainly provides widely
recognized benefits,71 it also has the potential to entrench a great deal of
individually rational, yet collectively tragic, decision-making on the part of
subnational governments.
Ultimately, the primary characteristic shared by Hardin’s pasture and a
federal system of government is an entrenchment of segmented decisionmaking by individual entities regarding the appropriation of resources
within a defined boundary—whether it be a pasture, a private property, a
state, or a nation. In the case of the herders, this shared trait may have no
tragic consequences if they can successfully establish and implement
management rules from within the group, or if an external actor can do so
from without. Similarly, resource management in federal systems may
suffer no tragic consequences if either the national government maintains
the authority to establish, or to participate in establishing, rules for
managing the national commons, or in the alternative if subnational entities
themselves establish rules for sustainably managing natural capital within
their governmental jurisdictions. But what if the national government does
not maintain such power? What if subnational governments maintain
exclusive72 constitutional regulatory authority over the appropriation of

71.
The numerous benefits of decentralized governance are well documented: reduction of central
government bureaucracy resulting in more efficient decision-making; better access to local knowledge
leading to increased understanding of local needs and constraints; better information flow between local
and central governments, as well as between the government and private sector; greater local
cooperation and stakeholder interest in governance participation; and reduction of central government
“political meddling” and corruption. Hans M. Gregersen et al., Forest Governance in Federal Systems:
An Overview of Experiences and Implications for Decentralization, in THE POLITICS OF
DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER 13, 27–28 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer & Doris
Capistrano eds., 2005). Other scholars have noted that,
decentralization produces more just and equitable outcomes and that localized control is
more functional than state control. Put simply, consultation and collaboration with social
movements and voluntary associations provides an effective means of harnessing local
knowledge and agency in both plan making and implementation. Engaged civic actors can
also act as a check on state power—thus helping to democratize governance—and offer a
counterpoint to its limited, rationalist worldview.
Marcus B. Lane, Decentralization or Privatization of Environmental Governance? Forest Conflict and
Bioregional Assessment in Australia, 19 J. OF RURAL STUD. 283, 284–85 (2003) (citation omitted).
These benefits track the noted benefits of federalism generally, as summarized by Professor Rosenn,
that federalism promotes economic growth, reciprocity in the enforcement of the law, safeguard against
the potential tyranny of centralized power, encouragement of local citizen participation in governance,
experimentation with new forms of governance (“laboratories for experimentation”), and administrative
efficiency as decentralized governments can specifically tailor laws to fit local needs. Keith S. Rosenn,
Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 6–7
(1994).
72.
Though there may be room for interpretation and constitutional debate regarding whether the
U.S. actually maintains such exclusive spheres, in some other federal systems this exclusivity is not in
doubt. Canada, for example, has specific constitutional text granting regulatory control over subnational
forest management policy exclusively to the provinces, and the federal government has been unable to
gain virtually any foothold on subnational forest policy, even through incentive-based actions. See
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certain categories of natural capital and fail to act? If so, then subnational
governments or private property owners may in fact operate as rational
commons herders on the national commons as they attempt to maximize
local benefit to the detriment of the environment more broadly defined by
national boundaries. Stated in commons terminology, subnational entities
appropriate jurisdictional resource units of natural capital from the national
resource system.
Contrast the status of natural capital within a federal “national
commons” with its status in unitary systems of government. Unitary
systems have subnational governmental units, but those units do not
maintain exclusive regulatory authority over resource appropriation.73
Thus, unitary systems maintain authority to establish uniform rules across a
national resource system segmented by subnational governmental
boundaries. The national government may therefore act unconstrained by
subnational governments in designing rules for appropriating the nation’s
natural capital. For example, in England the national government maintains
the ultimate authority to establish land use planning standards, including
urban growth boundaries around municipalities, in order to prevent urban
sprawl and preserve the nation’s natural capital.74
In contrast, the United States’ national government does not currently
maintain recognized constitutional authority to establish urban growth
boundaries because land use regulation has long been considered a
constitutional authority reserved exclusively to state and local
governments.75 Even though growth boundaries “reduc[e] the need to
extend infrastructure beyond existing service areas and preserv[e] rural
lands and open space,”76 subnational governments in the United States are
not coordinating natural capital appropriation in a manner that protects the
resources both within and without these geopolitical boundaries. There is a

Blake Hudson, Fail-Safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest
Policy, 44 CONN. L. REV. 925 (2012).
73.
Unitary systems of government “may have subnational levels of governments; but these are
not constitutionally empowered to make decisions on major government services and functions; rather,
they are subordinate units,” Gregersen et al., supra note 71, at 15, that are intended to “balance the
burden of governance.” Ian Ferguson & Cherukat Chandrasekharan, Paths and Pitfalls of
Decentralization for Sustainable Forest Management: Experiences of the Asia Pacific Region, in THE
POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER, supra note 71, at 63, 65.
74.
Jack S. Frierson, How Are Local Governments Responding to Student Rental Problems in
University Towns in the United States, Canada, and England?, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 497, 507
(2005). This is not to say that all unitary systems of government adequately manage appropriation of
natural capital in the national commons, or that no federal systems do. Rather, this exercise is only
meant to point out how national governments in federal systems may be legally restrained from acting
where unitary systems will not be.
75.
See infra notes 101–108 and accompanying text.
76.
PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE, AND
CONSERVATION 1048 (2006).
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striking disparity in the United States between the number of subnational
governments and the number of urban growth boundaries. Although there
are nearly 88,000 subnational governmental units, only “[o]ver a hundred
such urban constraint programs are now in place around the United
States.”77 To make matters worse, without coordinated action among
groups of subnational governments on larger scales—potentially achieved
with input by a national government—even these limited efforts may be
ineffective. Growth boundaries in urban areas “appear to reduce sprawl and
create often vibrant urban communities,” yet “[b]uoyed by market pressure
and citizen preferences for low-density development, however, new
development still often leaks out of the growth boundaries into the
countryside”78—largely because neighboring governments refuse to
participate in any type of coordinated effort.
In the absence of coordinated action to curb continued destruction of
natural capital, the fifty state governments in the United States, as the
primary arbiters of land use regulation at the state and local levels, remain
free to appropriate natural capital from the national commons in an
individually rational way. This gives rise to the potential that one state may
maintain more lax land use standards than another in an effort to attract
economic development. States with more strict environmental and land use
standards may lose out to neighboring states on economic development
opportunities, even though their standards may better protect the nation’s
natural capital in the aggregate. Thus each of the fifty states has a rational
incentive to maximize individual economic gain through the maintenance
of lax land use standards to the detriment to the nation’s natural capital—
fifty rational herders on the national commons.
The attributes that federal systems of government share with a
commons have profound implications for global resource governance.
There are over 160 unitary systems of government,79 while there are only
twenty-nine federal systems of government.80 Though there are far fewer
federal systems of government than unitary systems, approximately 47% of
the world’s land base is contained within federal nations’ boundaries.81
77.
Id.
78.
Id. at 1049.
79.
See Unitary State, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_state (last visited June
13, 2012).
80.
See Federation, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_states (last modified Feb.
14, 2012).
81.
The total surface area of the earth is 148,940,000 km2. Federal systems of government
maintain the following surface areas: Argentina: 2,780,400 km2; Australia: 7,692,024 km2; Austria:
83,871 km2; Belgium: 30,528 km2; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 51,129 km2; Brazil: 8,514,877 km2;
Canada: 9,984,670 km2; Comoros: 1,862 km2; Ethiopia: 1,104,300 km2; Germany: 357,114 km2; India:
3,166,414 km2; Iraq: 438,317 km2; Malaysia: 330,803 km2; Mexico: 1,964,375 km2; Micronesia: 702
km2; Nepal: 147,181 km2; Nigeria: 923,768 km2; Pakistan: 881,912 km2; Russia: 17,098,242 km2; Saint
Kitts and Nevis: 261 km2; Somalia: 637,657 km2; South Africa: 1,221,037 km2; South Sudan: 644,329
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With certain other resources, such as global forests, the numbers are even
starker. Scholars are increasingly recognizing the importance of the world’s
forests in combating climate change.82 Even though federal systems of
government only comprise approximately 13% of the world’s governments,
they maintain control over 70%–80% of the world’s forests.83 Thus, the
vast majority of the world’s forests are contained within systems of
government with the greatest potential to constitute a commons. This is
both the great irony and the great challenge of our time—the placement of
perhaps the most critical resource to combating climate change largely
within systems of government that present potentially tragic complications
for holistic resource management.
As noted in Part II.A., how one defines a resource system
(nonexcludable) and a resource unit (excludable) determines whether a
system of depletable natural capital constitutes a commons. There are three
natural capital resource systems that comprise a federal system of
government, nested one within another. Within each of these systems the
appropriation of depletable resource units of natural capital is
nonexcludable, rendering each system a commons. Each of these commons
is here described to define both the resource system and its constituent
resource units and to establish the context for Part III.84:
(1) The state commons: depletable natural capital on one parcel of
private property qualifies as a resource unit within the state resource system
in the absence of state government regulation—excludable to other private
property owners due to property boundaries, but non-excludable within the

km2; Sudan: 1,861,484 km2; Switzerland: 41,284 km2; United Arab Emirates: 83,600 km2; United
States: 9,526,468 km2; Venezuela: 912,050 km2. Thus, federal nation total surface area is 70,480,669
km2, or roughly 47% of the world’s total surface area. List of Countries and Dependencies by Area,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_and_dependencies_by_area (last modified
Aug. 25, 2012).
82.
See A. Karsenty et al., Summary of the Proceedings of the International Workshop “The
International Regime, Avoided Deforestation and the Evolution of Public and Private Policies Towards
Forests in Developing Countries” Held in Paris, 21–23rd November 2007, 10(3) INT’L FORESTRY REV.
424 (2008); T. Johns, F. Merry, C. Stickler, D. Nepstad, N. LaPorte, & S. Goetz, A Three-Fund
Approach to Incorporating Government, Public and Private Forest Stewards Into a REDD Funding
Mechanism, 10(3) INT’L FORESTRY REV. 458 (2008); A. Angelsen, REDD Models and Baselines, 10(3)
INT’L FORESTRY REV. 465 (2008); K. Levin, C. McDermott, & B. Cashore, The Climate Regime as
Global Forest Governance: Can Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(REDD) Initiatives Pass a ‘Dual Effectiveness’ Test?, 10(3) INT’L FORESTRY REV. 538 (2008).
83.
Arnoldo Contreras-Hermosilla et al., Forest Governance in Countries with Federal Systems of
Government: Lessons for Decentralization, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL FORESTRY RESEARCH
GOVERNANCE BRIEF, no. 39, Jan. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/
pdf_files/GovBrief/GovBrief0739E.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
84.
Though this Article highlights the commonalities between these nested levels, there are
potentially important distinctions, primarily related to whether commons tragedies are driven by a lack
of legal authority at one level or another, or rather by lack of political action in the presence of
authority. These nuances are discussed further in Hudson, supra note 18.
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state because no private property owner can be legally excluded from
appropriating the resource unit from the state resource system.
(2) The national commons: depletable natural capital within a state
qualifies as a resource unit within the national resource system in the
absence of national government regulation—excludable to other states
because of state boundaries, but nonexcludable within the nation because
no state can be legally excluded from appropriating the resource unit from
the national resource system.
(3) The global commons: the depletable natural capital within a nation
qualifies as a resource unit within the global resource system in the absence
of an effective and enforceable international agreement—excludable to
other nations because of national boundaries, but nonexcludable on the
globe because no nation can be legally excluded from appropriating the
resource unit from the global resource system.
Before moving to the next Part, it is important to make a conceptual
comparison between the nested natural capital commons created by federal
systems of government and Hardin’s pastoral commons. We might
typically imagine that the herders roam around on Hardin’s commons as
they graze their cattle. It is true that a parcel of private property, a state, and
a nation cannot move around their respective commons. Yet, though some
traditional commons appropriators take on this characteristic of mobility,
such as fishing boats on the high seas or loggers roaming about an open
forest, other commons appropriators are quite stationary. Groundwater
aquifers, for example, are widely considered the prototypical commons
resource.85 The parties withdrawing water from the aquifer, however, are
most often anchored to the surface, as is the case with private farms or
housing developments. Even though the appropriators are not mobile, their
unchecked consumption of the resource leads to its degradation and
destruction. Thus, it is not the mobility of the appropriator that makes a
commons, but rather the intensity of co-appropriators’ unchecked use.
Likewise, each of Hardin’s herders could stand immobile in one spot of
the pasture, but may nevertheless continue adding cattle until eventually
one herder’s cows start merging with the cows of another herder standing
far away—it is the increased intensity of use by the addition of more cattle
that drives the tragic outcome. This is the same mechanism by which
private property owners, states, and nations remain stationary while still
appropriating natural capital with increasing intensity in an unchecked
fashion. Furthermore, these entities may do so with constitutional sanction
in federal systems of government, rendering federal constitutions the

85.

Schlager, supra note 9, at 134–35.
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keystone that connects and supports86 these nested commons and
determines whether or not they will be governed in a sustainable manner.
E. The Role of Keystone Constitutions
A key question in commons analysis is “whether there is congruence
between the spatial scale of the resource system itself and the spatial scale
of the jurisdictions able to take governance and make management
decisions related to that resource.”87 This is an important question because
“the boundaries of governmental units are usually arbitrarily drawn when
viewed from the perspective of most natural resources,” and “very often the
spatial boundaries of a particular resource are not congruent with any one
particular governance unit.”88 In federal systems of government, perhaps
more than in any other governmental system, there is likely to be
incongruity between the spatial scale of the resource system, stretching
from one side of the nation to another, and the spatial scale of the
jurisdictions with authority over resource management—which in the
United States are the fifty states and the thousands of other subnational
governments in between. This likelihood increases when federal
constitutions grant the myriad subnational governments within national
borders exclusive regulatory authority over natural capital appropriation.
All federal systems of government maintain written constitutions that
are the ultimate source from which legal governance flows.89 These
constitutions lie at the very center of the nested commons of federal natural
capital governance. If a federal constitution grants subnational governments
exclusive regulatory authority over natural capital appropriation, then those
governments may rationally refuse to exercise that authority. As previously
discussed, their failure to act allows rational individuals to appropriate
subnational natural capital unchecked, which in turn means that rational
subnational governments are facilitating the appropriation of national
natural capital unchecked. In turn, the constitutional structure of those
national governments likewise constrains global natural capital governance.
A federal government that cannot bind subnational governments cannot
fully, with the most flexibility, participate in global treaty-making.

86.
See supra note 2.
87.
Burger et al., supra note 10, at 7.
88.
Id.
89.
See Martin Edelman, Written Constitutions, Democracy and Judicial Interpretation: The
Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism, 68 ALB. L. REV. 585 (2005); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An
Overview of Court Review for Constitutionality in the United States, 57 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1997);
see also Constitutional Documents, WIKISOURCE, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Portal:Constitutional_
documents (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
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Federal constitutions, therefore, act as a keystone of nested natural
capital commons governance, as illustrated in Figure 1 in the Introduction.
Federal constitutions either maintain a strong arch of resource governance,
the integrity of which adequately addresses commons concerns across
resource management scales, or contributes to a weak and vulnerable arch
of resource governance, likely to crumble due to a legal entrenchment of a
commons not only within national boundaries but also on global scales. In
other words, federal constitutions establish the institutional framework that
must facilitate policy formulation if national-level governance is to have
legal authority to rectify natural capital commons issues on subnational,
national, and international scales.
On a very rudimentary level, successful policy formulation and
implementation requires four basic components: (1) institutional capacity
of the government to formulate policy, (2) political will of the government
to formulate policy, (3) institutional capacity of the government to enforce
policy, and (4) political will of the government to enforce policy. These
components intersect as shown in Figure 2, below. While governmental
systems can contain any combination of these elements, the presence of all
four components can be said to result in a successful policy. The study of
federal constitutions undertaken in this Article falls into quadrant 1 of
Figure 2 because the constitutional order of a nation is the institution that
provides the legal mechanism of policy formulation. Without a government
first maintaining such an institution, institutional capacity to enforce and
political will to formulate and implement policy are irrelevant.
Figure 2
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For example, in the United States, if the Constitution provides federal
regulatory authority over some subject matter (component 1) and Congress
maintains the political will to pass legislation pursuant to that authority
(component 2), then policy formulation can be successful. Such is the case
with the Clean Air Act (CAA),90 for instance, whereby the Commerce
Clause provides federal regulatory authority over regulation of industrial
pollutants, and Congress acted on its political will to regulate those
pollutants through the passage of the CAA. The question that naturally
follows is whether a government can achieve successful policy
implementation. The Environmental Protection Agency’s exercise of
administrative authority granted to it by Congress, as well as the enlisting
of state government support in implementing the CAA, provide sufficient
institutional capacity to enforce the CAA (component 3). Furthermore,
though there are certainly improvements to be made in enforcement, as
evidenced by areas of CAA noncompliance around the country, there also
exists sufficient political will to enforce the CAA (component 4), as
evidenced by the continued monitoring and enforcement actions performed
by the institutions responsible for administration of the act. The presence of
these four components has resulted in a successful policy, as air quality in
the United States has improved greatly since the time of the CAA. While
the strength of the success of any policy may always be debated,
discernible metrics exist that can be assessed to help observers determine as
a general matter whether the policy problem the government sought to
remedy has in fact been addressed. In this way, the CAA provides a good
example of a successful policy.
Other federal systems of government maintain a different combination
of policy formulation and implementation components, leading to a very
different outcome regarding the efficacy of governance via national
government policymaking. For example, Brazil maintains some of the most
stringent, explicit forest-protection mandates in any federal constitution,
and the national government is constitutionally empowered to guide policy
for subnational forest management.91 In this way the Brazilian national
90.
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2006).
91.
Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution declares that forests are “part of the national
patrimony, and they shall be used, as provided by law, under conditions which ensure the preservation
of the environment.” BRAZ. C.F. (1998) title VII, ch. VI, art. 225. Article 23 establishes that the
national, state and local governments have the power to “preserve the forests,” id. at title III, ch. II, art.
23, while Article 24 establishes that they may do so with concurrent legislative competence, id. at art.
24. Regarding concurrent legislation, Article 24 describes the national government’s role as engaging in
the “establishment of general rules,” and preserves the “supplementary competence of the states” to
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government has been able to successfully formulate forest policy
(components 1 and 2)—the Brazilian federal government has had the
political will to both include explicit forest provisions in the Brazilian
constitution as well as pass legislation pursuant to that power (component
2),92 and the constitution, in turn, is the institution that legally empowers
the federal government to engage in forest policy formulation (component
1). Nonetheless, Brazil is missing crucial components of policy
implementation, as the national government is unable to enforce legislation
under its broad powers. The Brazilian government is plagued by a weak
judiciary, lack of financial resources, lack of an enforcement culture, and
corruption.93 Without maintaining crucial components of policy
implementation, national policies will not ultimately be successful. Indeed,
in Brazil there is “a profound disconnect between environmental law ‘on
the books’ and environmental law as it operates in practice.”94 Other
scholars assert that “[o]n paper, constitutional rights are better protected in
Brazil than in virtually any other country,”95 but “[t]he problem is in the
disturbing distance that separates the rights inscribed on paper from their
effective exercise, and above all in the guaranty of their exercise in
practical life.”96 Yet others argue that “[t]he ineffectiveness of laws alone
to protect the environment is nowhere as evident as in the contemporary
destruction of the Amazonian . . . forests,”97 and that “[a]ttempts to embody
environmental protection clauses in national constitutions, such as Brazil’s,
do not appear to have appreciably influenced the prevailing bureaucratic
culture.”98
The United States CAA and the case of Brazilian forest policy provide
just two examples of how the four components of policy formulation and
legislate, id. at art. 24. Article 24 declares, however, that “[t]he supervenience of a federal law over
general rules suspends the effectiveness of a state law to the extent that the two are contrary.” Id.
92.
Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of Forests in
Regulating Climate Change, 87 IND. L.J. 1455 (2012).
93.
See id.
94.
LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL 55–56 (2008). As a further example, scholars have noted that Provisional
Measure No. 1511, passed in July 1996 in order to increase forest reserves and restrict clear-cutting,
“impose[s] stricter requirements on paper, . . . [but] are not routinely enforced and represent merely
temporary measures rather than long-standing environmental change.” Janelle E. Kellman, The
Brazilian Legal Tradition and Environmental Protection: Friend or Foe, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 145, 156 (2002). For further discussion on how judicial deficiencies, lack of education and
training for the citizenry, and financial and other societal constraints hamstring enforcement of
environmental laws in Brazil, see id. at 160–64.
95.
Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Brazil: Developments Under the 1988 Constitution, 7 SW
J.L. & TRADE AMERICAS 291, 318 (2000).
96.
Id. at 318 (quoting Carta ao Leitor, VEJA, Feb. 15, 1989, at 23 (original in Portuguese)).
97.
Emilio F. Moran, The Law, Politics, and Economics of Amazonian Deforestation, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 397 (1994).
98.
Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmental Law in Postcolonial Societies: Straddling the Local–
Global Institutional Spectrum, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 26 (2000).
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implementation can exist in a variety of combinations. More study should
certainly be undertaken to understand which combination of factors
different systems of government maintain regarding a range of policies.
Such study will yield valuable insights into the specific drivers of policy
failure. The scenario with which this Article is concerned, however, is
whether institutional capacity to formulate policy exists in the first instance
(component 1)—an aspect of policymaking that is far too often overlooked
in the scholarship. For example, a national government in a federal system
may have the political will to formulate a national land use policy
(component 2) and may maintain both the institutional capacity
(component 3) and political will (component 4) to enforce such a policy. If
there is a question as to whether the constitution grants the national
government legal authority to act in this manner (component 1), however,
then the policy will either never be formulated in the first instance or even
if it is formulated and successful on the ground it may be challenged and
held unconstitutional by the courts. The result, of course, is that the
policy’s success on the ground will not save it from being struck down as
beyond the scope of national government authority. Such may be the case
in the United States, where the keystone constitution appears very weak
regarding natural capital appropriation connected to land-use-related
development and resource extraction activities, the direct regulation of
which has long been considered the exclusive constitutional purview of
subnational governments.
The result is a nested natural capital commons, legally entrenched by
the very Constitution that provides both private property rights and the
governmental system that together have supposedly replaced the commons.
The next Part will analyze these nested commons, providing a more
thorough description of their composition and function in order to explain
how federal constitutional structure is key to solving natural capital
commons tragedies within both federal systems of government and the
international community.
III. FEDERAL SYSTEMS AS A NESTED COMMONS: THE CASE OF THE
UNITED STATES
Given the wide variety of ecological problems that individuals face
at diverse scales, an important design principle is getting the
boundaries of any one system roughly to fit the ecological
boundaries of the problem it is designed to address. Since most
ecological problems are nested from very small local ecologies to
those of global proportions, following this principle requires a
substantial investment in governance systems at multiple levels—
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each with some autonomy but each exposed to information,
sanctioning, and actions from below and above.99
- Elinor Ostrom
A. The State Commons: Natural Capital Appropriated on Private
Lands
A state-level commons exists in the United States when state
governments refuse to exercise their constitutional authority to intervene in
the appropriation of natural capital on private lands.100 Their failure to do
so renders the depletable natural capital in the state nonexcludable because
no individual private property owner can be legally excluded from
appropriating natural capital from private lands.
In the United States, private land use regulation is a power traditionally
reserved to state and local governments (or “subnational governments”)
under the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution reserves for the states all powers not delegated to the federal
government and may act as a limit on Congress’ regulatory authority,
“particularly in ‘traditional areas of state and local authority,’ such as land
use.”101 State and local governments regulate private property pursuant to
their “police power” authority to protect the “general welfare.”102
Numerous scholars have observed that “[t]he weight of legal and political
opinion holds that this allocation of power in the [U.S.] leaves the states in
charge of regulating how private land is used,”103 and that “[l]and use law
has always been a creature of state and local law.”104 The U.S. Supreme
Court case that established the foundation for the land use regulatory
patterns we see today, Euclid v. Ambler Realty,105 has been described as a
“sweeping paean to the supremacy of state regulation over private
property.”106 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “the
99.
ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 258 (2005).
100.
For the purposes of this Article local governments are consolidated within the discussion of
state governments, since local governments ultimately derive their power to regulate land uses from
state government grants of that authority. Further and more detailed analysis of all levels of
government, however, may certainly be made in future research.
101.
James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource Protection, in THE
EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F.
Bates eds., 2009).
102.
See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
103.
JOHN R. NOLON, PATRICIA E. SALKIN, & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008).
104.
Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003).
105.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
106.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 76, at 967.
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States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use,”107 and that
“[r]egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.”108
States and localities may utilize this paramount authority to set zoning
standards for municipalities, to encourage planned land development for
economic growth, to set agricultural standards related to land use, and to
establish private forest management standards, among a variety of other
land use directives that might further the “general welfare.” Though current
constitutional interpretations of the Commerce Clause grant the federal
government limited, indirect authority to impact land use activities related
to, for example, endangered species and wetlands,109 subnational
governments maintain primary responsibility for regulating “if, when, and
how” private property owners appropriate natural capital on their private
lands.110
What if state and local governments choose not to regulate the
appropriation of natural capital on private lands, or to create some other
cooperative mechanism to manage it effectively? Subnational governments
are quite active in dictating regulations guiding the development of humanmade capital on private lands, including the location of residential versus
commercial developments relative to each other in a municipality, how tall
buildings should be, how far from the road homes should be constructed,
minimum or maximum lot size for homes, to name just a few examples.111
Subnational governments may even establish “smart growth” plans
conditioning the development of new human-made capital upon a showing
that the requisite services will be available to new commercial tenants or
residents.112 Even though states participate quite vigorously in dictating the
planning and establishment of human-made capital, these plans are largely
development-centric and are focused on the expansion of human-made

107.
SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (citing Hess v. Port
Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1944), for the proposition that “regulation of
land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments.”).
108.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added) (citing FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982), that “regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential
state activity” (emphasis added)).
109.
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687
(1995). See Hudson, supra note 16, at 391.
110.
Arguments may be made that the federal government should or does maintain such
constitutional authority under certain circumstances, but Congress has yet to assert such authority and
so the question has simply not been tested in the courts. Indeed, in the little discussion of federal
authority over land use regulation that has taken place, at least at the U.S. Supreme Court level, serious
“constitutional questions” have been raised about the prospect. See SWANCC and Rapanos, supra
notes 107–108.
111.
GOLDSTEIN & THOMPSON, supra note 76, at 980.
112.
Id. at 1042–49.
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capital—often at the expense of natural capital formerly maintained on the
land.
To be sure, various subnational governments maintain environmental
laws meant to protect natural capital, such as state biodiversity laws.113 In
addition, in the absence of state regulation, private property owners may
voluntarily undertake conservation activities regarding natural capital on
their property, thus harnessing the power that private property rights can
provide for environmental protection. Environmental non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and private individuals have used the power of
private property rights for the sole purpose of conserving environmental
amenities.114 Others have captured the power of ecosystem services within
markets, striking a balance between protecting the environment and
facilitating economic revenues and progress, and have therefore gained
economic return simply from protecting natural capital.115 Thus
privatization of landed natural capital can serve important societal and
environmental interests.
Though privatization may facilitate a solution to commons problems, in
the absence of state regulation or Ostrom’s successful collective action
model, the avoidance of commons tragedies only occurs when private
property owners choose to not otherwise take on the characteristics of
“rational private property owners.”116 In the United States rapid
development and sprawl threaten natural capital present on lands owned by
rational private property owners who choose to maximize individual
economic return from their property to the detriment of the property’s long113.
See generally Linda Breggin & Susan George, Planning for Biodiversity: Sources of
Authority in State Land Use Laws, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2003); A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity
Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315 (1995).
114.
See Greg Fales, IP Donates 2,650 Acres in Mississippi to the Conservation Fund,
PIMA’S . . . PAPERMAKER, Apr. 1999, Vol. 81, Iss. 4, at 10; Bill Finch, Deal Preserves More Forest
Land, MOBILE PRESS REG., Mar. 29, 2006, at A1. Conservation efforts on private lands have greatly
increased this decade. See Press Release, Land Trust Alliance, Private Land Conservation in U.S. Soars
(Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/news/alliance-news/privateland-conservation-in-u.s.-soars. See also, e.g., John A. Baden, Kelo’s Consequences for Conservation,
BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Aug. 16, 2005), available at http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/
opinions/article_07dd0217-3bda-5cec-a24a-9de1b421c178.html.
115.
See Kenny, supra note 65; Bradley I. Raffle, Carrots and Sticks: Incentivizing Private Land
Conservation, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (May 11, 2006), http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/
article.opinion.php?component_id=4349&component_version_id=6266&language_id=12.
116.
Hudson, supra note 62, at 388. The purpose of establishing private property rights for
commons resources is
to turn rational individual decisions that lead to irrational collective harms into rational
collective outcomes. Stated differently, the goal is to turn a prisoner’s dilemma, whereby
parties with access to a commons resource believe they are making a decision that is in their
own ‘best’ interest but that in fact results in a worse outcome for every party involved, into a
Pareto-optimal outcome, whereby it would be impossible for a party to make himself better
off without necessarily making another party worse off.
Id. (citing OSTROM, supra note 25, at 5).
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term natural capital values. Subnational governments not only passively
leave private property owners to their rationality when they refuse to devise
inputs into natural capital appropriation, but they actually encourage
private property owners to replace natural capital with human-made capital.
As explained below in Part III.B., subnational governments do so because
they too are free to act as rational entities in the absence of a higher level of
government coordinating their actions or in the absence of voluntary
collective arrangements with other subnational governments per Ostrom’s
model.
The predisposition of both subnational governments and private
property owners to move “rationally” toward a natural capital tragedy does
not inevitably flow out of incapacity to choose otherwise—though
information problems can explain that potential causal relationship.117
Rather, this rationality follows quite naturally from the institutional
incentives provided by our economic system. Many of the consumer
reports and indices that society relies upon to gauge the strength of the
economy are explicitly linked to land development activities that
permanently appropriate natural capital and replace it with human-made
capital—“new home starts” are just one example.118 For instance, in the
midst of one of the most serious economic downturns in U.S. history, an
April 2011 report on growth in new housing construction raised some
analysts’ hopes that our nation was on a path toward economic recovery.
Commerce Secretary Gary Locke issued a statement, commenting that
“[d]espite continued volatility, today’s numbers show welcome growth
within the housing market,’” and that “[t]here are positive signs for
widespread growth throughout the economy and a stronger housing market
in the coming year.”119 These statements appear quite frequently in the
news, representing our societal preference for human-made capital over
natural capital as a metric of economic productivity and growth.
Not only do we value “new home starts” because that metric makes us
feel good about the state of the economy, but increasing population
pressures make the development of new homes a practical reality. Experts
estimate that increasing populations in the United States will result in the
development of 70 million additional housing units by 2040, 40 million of
those being built on new residential lots.120
117.
Hudson, supra note 62.
118.
Ryan Barnes, Economic Indicators: Housing Starts, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/releases/housingstarts.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
119.
Ben Rooney, Housing Construction Encouraging, CNN (Apr. 19, 2011, 11:15 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/19/news/economy/housing_starts_building_permits/index.htm.
120.
Arthur C. Nelson & Robert Lang, The Next 100 Million, PLANNING MAG., Jan. 2007, at 4,
available at http://law.du.edu/images/uploads/rmlui/conferencematerials/2008/thursday/Americaat400/
TheNext100Million.pdf.
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Indeed, our reliance on the permanent appropriation of natural capital
as a metric for the strength of state and national economies is perhaps best
demonstrated by a recent study undertaken by researchers at Brown
University.121 The researchers tracked, via satellite, nighttime changes in
the intensity of artificial light over countries around the globe, determining
that increases in light parallel increases in that country’s household
incomes—thus signaling growth in gross domestic product (GDP).122
Consequently, the clearing of evermore land, the subsequent increase in
development, and the generation of (mostly) fossil fuel-derived electricity
facilitates socially desirable outcomes even if at odds with the preservation
of natural capital. This study vividly demonstrates not only local but also
global reliance on the replacement of natural capital with human-made
capital as a key indicator of strong and growing economies—a result that
every rational subnational and national government desires. In this way we
can see that even in the presence of national, state and private property
boundaries, rational nations, states and private individuals are content—
even encouraged by economics—to rush toward just the type of tragedy
described by Hardin.
Ultimately, natural capital in the form of biodiversity, wetlands,
pasturelands, forests and other resources, even when contained within a
private property system, is subject to overuse and degradation. Why do
private property rights not succeed in curbing the rationality of property
owners regarding the appropriation of natural capital? The answer lies in
the fact that natural capital on private lands is itself a commons,
maintaining the key elements of a commons resource: (1) it is depletable,
such that appropriation of natural capital by one private property owner
renders it unavailable to others for use or appropriation; and (2) it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to exclude a private property owner
from appropriating the natural capital available on his or her property.
As discussed earlier, the theory driving privatization of commons
resources is that fencing it in will cause an individual herder to take better
care not to overconsume the grass resource. What is often overlooked,
however, is the difference between the legal right to own land and the legal
right to use land. Private land is not in and of itself a commons. Though the
land base is certainly depletable, meeting the first element of a commons
resource, property owners are legally entitled to exclude others from the
land itself. It is very difficult, however, to exclude any landowner from a
use that appropriates a depletable resource unit of natural capital present on
private property. Indeed, the very nature of private property, providing
121.
J. VERNON HENDERSON ET AL., MEASURING ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM OUTER SPACE
(2011), available at http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/henderson/papers/hsw201104081.pdf.
122.
Measuring Growth from Outer Space, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, at 63.
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stringent protections for both use of property and the right to alienate
property, allows natural capital to remain a commons—even though the
private land upon which it situated is no longer so.
In the context of Hardin’s example, we can see this by asking,
how [did] Hardin’s rational herder [come] to have pasturelands in
the first place? Perhaps a private property rights system was
already in place and the rational herder simply bought the property
from a rational forester, who had managed the land for forest
products until a shift in the market simultaneously caused the forest
products industry to move overseas and agricultural products like
grass and sheep to become more valuable. Thus the rational herder
came to own the property by paying the rational forester a nice
sum—enough for the forester to rationally retire—and then
converted the property from forest land to agricultural land with a
plentitude of grass resources. Though grass resources remained, the
trees were gone, and gone too were the services they provided and
other resources present in the forest.123
Though an individual herder or forester can legally exclude others from
accessing his or her property, no individual herder, forester or other
property owner can, in the absence of government regulation or Ostrom’s
model, be excluded from either appropriating the natural capital on one’s
property or from selling it to another who will. So “even though the
forester’s trees were fenced in and privatized, as was the subsequent
herder’s pasture, a ‘tragedy’ is likely to occur at each step in the chain of
ownership regarding various important natural resources—even in the
presence of a private property rights system.”124 This is because commons
resources “are subtractable resources managed under a property regime in
which a legally defined user pool cannot be efficiently excluded from the
resource domain.”125 Because the user pool that is private property owners
in control of resource units of natural capital cannot be efficiently excluded
from the resource domain, natural capital on private lands meets this
definition. Furthermore, scholars have noted the potential of commons
resources to be present in privatized space in other property contexts, such
123.
Hudson, supra note 62, at 365. Such ecosystem services include managed forests’ role in
watershed protection, flood control, the safeguarding of habitat, biodiversity, genetic resources, and the
preservation of cultural and recreational values. See Bastiaan Louman et al., Forest Ecosystem Services:
A Cornerstone for Human Well-Being, in ADAPTATION OF FORESTS AND PEOPLE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE—A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 15, 17 (Risto Seppälä et al. eds., 2009), available at
http://www.iufro.org/science/gfep/embargoed-release/download-by-chapter/ (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
124.
Hudson, supra note 62, at 391.
125.
BUCK, supra note 55, at 5.
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as the commons nature of pollutable atmosphere present in airspace while
the airspace itself is private property that is “separately owned or
controlled.”126
In the modern context, consider a hypothetical from a later step in the
chain of private ownership.127 Assume that a herder with privatized pasture
lands is approached by a rational grocer, who wants to develop a market to
sell various agricultural products for human consumption. Because market
demand for grocery products is high, the grocer is able to offer the herder
an attractive sum of money for the land—an amount substantial enough for
the herder to rationally retire. Furthermore, the country where the herders
and grocers reside, the “Rational States of America,” has established “new
grocery starts” as one of its primary metrics of economic growth—the more
new grocery starts, the stronger the economy. In order to utilize this
development to invigorate the economy, the government crafts various
policies aimed at promoting new grocery starts.
As a result, incentives are aligned for an increasing number of herders
to sell their pasture lands to an increasing number of grocers. Once the
grocers obtain a private property interest in the pasture lands it is difficult
to exclude their appropriation of depletable natural capital in the absence of
government intervention or internal arrangements among grocers. What
becomes of the grass? In establishing their places of business, the grocers
rid the land of the grass, construct their markets, and pave the property to
allow customer parking. Not only is the grass gone, but ambient
temperatures in the region rise due to the urban heat island effect,128
impervious surfaces on the property lead to pollution and greater risk of
flooding downstream, the population’s water supply is potentially reduced
as groundwater aquifer recharge is slowed, and carbon sequestration
capabilities are eliminated, to name only a few environmental harms. In
other words, the grocers’ complete replacement of natural capital with
human-made capital in an effort to rationally maximize their economic
126.
Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green Economy, 59 UCLA L. REV. 270, 275 (2011). Other
scholars actually argue that “coastal regions are a commons containing many different common-pool
resources that can be extracted or exploited, are renewable, and can benefit from considerations of the
rights and responsibilities of the ‘commoners.’” Joanna Burger, Multiuse Coastal Commons: Personal
Watercraft, Conflicts, and Resolutions, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS, supra note 9, at 196.
Importantly, Burger includes within these common-pool resources “estuarine land for development.” Id.
Burger continues that “[c]oastal commons resources are particularly difficult to manage because there
are so many players, including landowners, fishers, other business owners and operators, recreationists,
and natural-resource managers. Each group contains many diverse subgroups: (1) landowners include
public and private owners.” Id. at 199–200.
127.
This hypothetical was first put forth by the author in Hudson, supra note 62, at 389–90. This
example is more reflective of current times because it does not pit natural capital (forests) versus natural
capital (grass), a tension seen mostly during the shift to an agrarian society, but rather human-made
capital versus natural capital, a tension we see in modern industrialized society.
128.
DANIEL FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 24 (2d ed. 2009) (citing Heat Island
Effect, EPA (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/hiri/).
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interests provides them with a 100% return for their use of the property, but
they only suffer a fraction of the negative cost imposed by impervious
surfaces, the heat island effect, increased flooding, and loss of carbon
sequestration capabilities. Those costs are spread across the collection of
private properties in the region.
Thus, upon adjusting our scale of analysis we can see that “each
individual herder can be replaced by each individual private landowner
who owns a segment of private property, and the pastoral commons can be
replaced by the network of individually owned private properties which
constitutes ‘the environment . . . .’”129 In these circumstances a private
property owner may perceive that it is in their best interest to maximize
economic benefit received from property by replacing the natural capital on
his or her private land with human-made capital—after all, this act of
appropriation puts money in the landowner’s pocket and signals a strong
economy in the locale and perhaps the nation as a whole. Because the
negative cost of the lost natural capital is fractionally spread across the
collection of private properties in an area—called the “collective privatized
environment”130—the true harm occurring in the aggregate is cloaked. In
addition, the harm is also fractionally spread across time, as the impacts of
losing aggregated natural capital in an area may not be known for many
years to come.131
Ostrom herself argued that “even when particular rights are unitized,
quantified, and salable, the resource system is still likely to be owned in
common rather than individually.”132 The collective privatized environment
129.
Hudson, supra note 62, at 392.
130.
This phrase is a term of art used to describe the resource system of natural capital on private
lands.
131.
Indeed, information problems are compounded by the temporal nature of cost-benefit
analysis, as landowners trade future environmental harm for present economic return. As described by
Ostrom:
Individuals attribute less value to benefits that they expect to receive in the distant future,
and more value to those expected in the immediate future. In other words, individuals
discount future benefits—how severely depends on several factors. Time horizons are
affected by whether or not individuals expect that they or their children will be present to
reap these benefits, as well as by opportunities they may have for more rapid returns in other
settings.
OSTROM, supra note 25, at 34.
132.
Id. at 13. In discussing the value in leaving some resources as commons rather than
privatized, such as roads and waterways, other scholars have briefly alluded to the relationship between
our private property rights system and a commons. Carol Rose states:
Indeed a private property regime itself—whether governmental or customary—may be
understood as a managed ‘commons’—a meta-property held in common by those who
understand and follow its precepts. In a sense, a movement toward private property is a
movement from a ‘commons’ in a physical resource to a ‘commons’ in the social structure
of individualized resource management.
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 711, 746–47 (1986).
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is just such a resource system, comprised of the aggregated resource units
of natural capital contained on “unitized, quantified, and salable” private
properties within a state’s boundaries.133
As discussed in Part II.A. above, the critical concept to viewing the
natural capital on any one individual’s private land as a “resource unit”
within a commons is the fact that an individual herder can exclude others
from “resource units,” just as a private property owner can exclude others
from coming onto his or her property. Despite the fact that both the herder
and the private property owner can exclude others from appropriating the
resource unit itself, the pasture and the natural capital on private land
remains a constituent part of a commons resource system. Ostrom explains
that though a resource system can be jointly held and multiple
appropriators can appropriate resource units from the system, the resource
units themselves “are not subject to joint use or appropriation.”134
Take, for example, landowners X and Y, whose private properties are
adjacent to each other. Each maintains a resource unit of natural capital
defined by his or her respective property boundaries. That natural capital is
obviously depletable—rendering the first element of a commons resource
met. The second element exists as well, as the natural capital within the
resource system—that is, across the collection of private properties—is
non-excludable. The question of non-excludability does not mean that X
cannot exclude Y from X’s property, for that is certainly one of the most
stringently protected property rights in the bundle of sticks. Rather, the
question is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of excluding any individual
property owner from using his or her property in a way that appropriates
one resource unit of natural capital absent some external authority or
internal collective action agreement.
Just as two herders cannot occupy the same spot in the pasture, nor can
their cattle graze the exact same blades of grass, no two private property
owners’ parcels of land can occupy the same spot, nor can their bulldozers
remove the same natural capital. Herders may move around in the pasture,
just as X and Y may legally swap properties an infinite number of times. Or
herders may remain stationary and increase their herd until their herds
merge, just as private property owners may remain stationary until what
was once a forest spanning their respective properties is now a Walmart
parking lot abutting a Best Buy parking lot. In each case, however, the
pasture and private lands from which the resource units of natural capital
are appropriated remain a part of a system that is a natural capital
commons. As noted by Ostrom, all our private property rights system
ultimately does with regards to natural capital is pit each property owner
133.
134.

OSTROM, supra note 25.
Id. at 31.
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“against nature in a smaller terrain, rather than . . . against another player
in a larger terrain.”135
This is the first nested commons, the state natural capital commons,
where in the absence of subnational government regulation or Ostrom’s
collective action model, private property owners appropriate natural capital
in a way no different from Hardin’s herders. As noted by Ostrom,
“[s]imply closing the boundaries [of the resource system] is not enough,”136
because “[i]t is still possible for a limited number of appropriators to
increase the quantity of resource units they harvest so that they . . . totally
destroy the resource. Consequently, in addition to closing the boundaries,
some rules limiting appropriation and/or mandating provision are
needed.”137
Indeed, the destruction of privatized natural capital commons is
occurring on wide scales. Developers are appropriating resource units in
land at an alarming rate, which threatens irreparable damage to natural
capital resource systems. “Rational farmers,” for example, are selling
formerly valuable farmland to sprawling development interests because
“selling all or a portion of a farm for development [is] the only
economically sensible option . . . .”138 As a result, “the U.S. is losing nearly
twice as much farmland each year as it did in the early nineties . . . [and
fifty] acres of farmland are converted to development every hour.”139 In
addition, almost 1 million acres of forestland were lost to development
annually from 1992 to 1997, a rate of nearly 115 acres an hour.140 A recent
U.S. Forest Service report details that population growth and urbanization
will reduce forests in the southeastern United States alone by as much as
200 million acres, or 10%, over the next fifty years.141 In short, developers
are rushing to purchase, develop, and permanently remove valuable natural

135.
Id. at 12.
136.
Id. at 92.
137.
Id. (citation omitted). Development is a consumptive activity, and through market forces that
tie metrics of economic growth to development, it is extremely difficult to exclude appropriators from
consuming natural capital and from replacing it with human-made capital.
138.
BIODIVERSITY PROJECT, Farmland Loss at a Glance, in GETTING ON MESSAGE: MAKING
THE BIODIVERSITY–SPRAWL CONNECTION, available at http://www.comminit.com/en/node/
265588/306.
139.
Id. (also noting that “[b]etween 1982 and 1992, 4.2 million acres of farmland were lost to
development, [m]ore than 56 percent of our food comes from rapidly developing counties on the edge
of urban centers, 32 percent of best quality farmland in highly productive farming regions of the U.S.
has already been irretrievably lost to development . . . [, and] [c]urrently, 70 percent of prime farmland
is threatened by sprawl—234,500,000 acres nationwide”). See also Elizabeth Becker, 2 Farm Acres
Lost per Minute, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at A22.
140.
Jeffrey Kline, Our National Concern About Forestland Development, TIMBERWEST,
May/June 2005, at 50, available at http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/journals/pnw_2005_kline003.pdf.
141.
DAVID N. WEAR & JOHN G. GREIS, S. FOREST FUTURES PROJECT, SUMMARY REPORT 32–35
(2011), available at http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/reports/draft/summary_report.pdf.
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capital from land as quickly as possible. Paraphrasing Ostrom’s analysis
regarding groundwater basin commons, what a developer does not
purchase today in a developing area will be either developed or purchased
by rival developers tomorrow. The fear that developers cannot purchase
tomorrow what they do not purchase today undermines any countervailing
motive to forego current appropriation of natural capital for its future
availability.142 Thus, “[t]he two incentives reinforce one another to
aggravate the intensity of the [development] race. Without a change of
institutions, [developers] in such a situation acting independently will
severely overexploit the resource. Overexploitation can lead to destruction
of the resource itself.”143 Indeed, appropriators like developers “tend to be
in competitive relationships with each other . . . ; although often fiercely
independent, they are also interdependent because they are appropriating
from the same [commons] resource or related resources within an
ecosystem.”144
This primary commons in our nested set, the state-level commons,
exists because states often refuse to protect against natural capital
appropriation. To the contrary, states are incentivized to encourage the
development race in the name of economic growth. In doing so, states
resist striking a balance between privatization and government intervention
as co-solutions to commons problems, and leave natural capital on private
lands in its commons condition. As demonstrated in the next Part, when
scaled up to a higher plane of analysis, state failure to act also may
entrench a commons on a national scale.
B. The National Commons: Natural Capital Appropriated by States
A national-level natural capital commons exists in the United States
when: (1) state governments refrain from utilizing their primary regulatory
authority over land uses to intervene in subnational government or private
landowner appropriation of natural capital within state borders; and (2)
there is no recognized constitutional authority for the federal government to
intervene and coordinate state action. The entity that takes on the
characteristics of a rational herder in this instance is the state government,
and the scale of the resource system is broadened to the natural capital in
the nation as a whole. State failure to act and lack of federal constitutional
authority to intervene renders the depletable natural capital in the national
resource system non-excludable because no state can be excluded from

142.
OSTROM, supra note 25, at 109 (citation omitted).
143.
Id.
144.
Bonnie J. McCay, Community-Based and Cooperative Fisheries: Solutions to Fishermen’s
Problems, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS, supra note 9, at 175 (citation omitted).
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allowing unchecked appropriation of the resource unit of natural capital
within state boundaries.
Broadening the scale of commons analysis allows us to replace the
rational herder, grocer, farmer, forester, and private property owner with
the rational state government. As detailed in Part III.A., each state
government maintains an interest in keeping the land within its borders as
open as possible to economic development, an interest driven largely by
current economic growth indicators that place far greater value on humanmade capital than on natural capital. Thus individual states may maintain
lax land use restrictions relative to other states to avoid losing development
opportunities and economic growth. This “race to the bottom”145 among
states can stifle innovative land use measures, such as the aforementioned
growth boundaries around major metropolitan centers that could assist in
preserving natural capital increasingly under development pressures.
Professor Stewart aptly described the race to the bottom among states as a
form of the tragedy of the commons by noting that:
States and local communities whose citizens desire environmental
quality are also concerned with employment and economic growth.
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state
or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high
environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry
and obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting
environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of
capital to other areas with lower standards. If each locality reasons
in the same way, all will adopt lower standards of environmental
quality than they would prefer if there were some binding
mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact higher
standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or
development.146
Political scientist Neal Woods’ empirical study on an environmental
race to the bottom concluded that the stringency of state environmental
regulatory standards is indeed negatively impacted by the regulatory
decisions of regional “competitors” because states “attempt to reduce the
cost of doing business in the state in order to maintain

145.
See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It
“To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 281–82 (1997); Sarah D. Van Loh, The Latest and Greatest
Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 459, 462 (2004); Neal D. Woods, Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation:
A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 174 (2006).
146.
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211–12 (1977).
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current . . . production within the state and attract new production.”147
States are especially incentivized to act in this manner on environmental
issues because environmental benefits are often diametrically opposed to
short-term economic benefits. In other words, the externalities of
environmental harm are easy to shift to neighboring jurisdictions, which
“allow[s] nations, states, or localities to capture the economic benefits of
industrial production within their borders while compelling their neighbors
to shoulder the costs”148 of environmental harm. In addition, “political
officials may be motivated to reduce regulatory stringency to gain a
competitive advantage over their neighbors, thereby creating an aggregate
movement toward the lowest common denominator.”149
Take, for example, biodiversity as a form of natural capital. Professor
Karkkainen has provided a succinct summary of the driver for commons
reasoning among state governments in the context of biodiversity
protection:
Despite biodiversity’s global benefits, many biodiversity-rich
landowners, communities, and states will calculate that they will be
better off externalizing the costs of biodiversity by letting local
land conversion and development proceed apace, while leaving the
costs of conservation to others. Indeed, states and communities
with the largest inventories of undisturbed habitat and ecosystems
are probably the least inclined to protect them for two reasons.
First, from a local perspective, these lands may appear to be an
overabundant resource. Second, these localities may be reluctant to
protect these resources because they would carry a disproportionate
share of the localized costs of conservation if they must forego
development on a disproportionate percentage of their lands.150

147.
Woods, supra note 145, at 175.
148.
Id. at 174.
149.
Id. Whether heightened restrictions actually cause businesses to move elsewhere is a
separate question. Woods notes that,
[s]ocial science research on interstate environmental policy competition thus presents
something of a paradox. On one hand, there is little evidence that firms relocate on the basis
of regulatory cost differentials. On the other, survey evidence suggests that regulators
believe that they do, and this belief appears to affect state environmental policy. [There are]
two possible explanations for this paradox: that states are unaware of the actual decision
calculus facing firms in deciding where to locate, and that regulators face significant
political pressures to reduce the regulatory burden facing industry, regardless of this
calculus. . . . [B]oth forces may, in fact, be at work.
Id. at 177.
150.
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 74–75 (1997)
(citations omitted).
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Perhaps more importantly, some of the world’s top commons scholars
have cited federalism as a mechanism for exacerbating commons concerns,
since:
The [United States’] federal structure provides incentives for states
to place the priorities of their residents over those of the rest of the
nation. Virginia’s capacity to meet clean-air standards while its
industries contribute considerably to the pollution problems of
other states makes it rational for its elected state officials to opt out
of pollution agreements to protect the employment and economic
growth interests of their constituency. Whereas decentralized
governance certainly has a host of virtues, it can also serve as an
impediment to meeting the needs of a broader society.151
This is not to say that states invariably race to the bottom on all
environmental issues. Indeed, under certain circumstances states may race
to the top.152 Yet, as demonstrated in the previous Part, in the context of
land development and the unchecked appropriation of natural capital in the
name of economic development, subnational governments do seem to be
sprinting toward the bottom—that is, unless one views widespread urban
sprawl and continued land degradation as the top.
The land use race to the bottom provides a vivid depiction of the states
as rational herders on the national natural-capital commons. Not only do
states that maintain lax land use standards exacerbate the appropriation of
depletable natural capital, but they actually promote appropriative nonexclusivity, as their goal is to encourage the replacement of natural capital
with human-made capital, new growth, and economic development.153 As a
result, a great deal of natural capital waste and long-term economic
inefficiency occurs. This is especially the case when rational developers
freely develop greenfields simply because after cost-benefit analysis they
determine that redevelopment of brownfields, infill, or other previously
used lands would have more impact on their short-term bottom line.
A dramatic example of land use rationality gone awry is the
abandonment of indoor malls in the United States. In the 1980s and 1990s
indoor malls were in vogue and were the preferred development of choice
151.
Nives Dolsak et al., Adaptation to Challenges, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
337, 345 (Nives Dolsak & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2003).
152.
See generally HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996); DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995); Matthew Potoski, Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race
to the Bottom?, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 335 (2001); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
153.
See Stewart, supra note 146.
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for retailers. In the 2000s indoor malls have become far less popular, as
developers and retailers have moved to the indoor–outdoor, “town center”
mall hybrid model.154 Now, the indoor–outdoor mall is the development of
choice for retailers, who abandon their former home for greener pastures,
so to speak—rational herders moving from one part of the pastoral
commons to another, but only after all the natural capital in the former spot
is permanently consumed.
Indoor malls are quickly becoming “ghost towns” or “dead malls.”155
Between 2007 and 2009, four hundred of the United States’ 2,000 largest
indoor malls closed.156 There is even a website, Deadmalls.com, dedicated
to chronicling the story of hundreds of unused dead malls across the
country.157 The total amount of the nation’s natural capital appropriated to
create these now-vacant developments is no small amount, as indoor malls
are often larger than two million square feet—or, in starker terms, forty-six
acres of permanently-paved land.158 Not only is the natural capital value
lost, but the human-made capital value is significantly decreased because
the site of a dead mall “can rapidly turn into a wasteland of overgrown
weeds, cracked concrete, and stray animals, with looters picking sites clean
of copper tubing, light fixtures, and anything else that can be sold for
scrap.”159
States are complicit in facilitating these duplicative, inefficient, and
wasteful uses of developed land, promoting the replacement of natural
capital with human-made capital, even though pre-existing human capital
could be used for the same economic purpose. Yet the development race
between states continues, even in the presence of information regarding the
harm caused by wasted developments like dead malls. The actions of states
to either encourage new development or to abdicate environmental or land
use controls so as not to stifle development is a classic example of rational
commons reasoning that “[w]hen an individual user of the commons
resource unilaterally decides to cut back in the commons resource, the
appropriator is only leaving more for others . . . . Particularly in light of

154.
See Kris Hudson & Vanessa O’Connell, Recession Turns Malls into Ghost Towns, WALL ST.
J., May 22, 2009, at A1; Tony Dokoupil, Is the Mall Dead?, NEWSWEEK (November 12, 2008, 7:00
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2008/11/11/is-the-mall-dead.html.
155.
Hudson & O’Connell, supra note 154, at A1.
156.
The Vanishing Shopping Mall, THE WEEK (March 26, 2009, 9:50 AM),
http://theweek.com/article/index/94691/The_vanishing_shopping_mall.
157.
DEADMALLS.COM, http://deadmalls.com/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
158.
Largest Shopping Malls in the United States, SHOPPING CENTER STUDIES AT EASTERN
CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY, http://nutmeg.easternct.edu/~pocock/MallsLarge.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2012).
159.
The Vanishing Shopping Mall, supra note 156.
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how the commons resource allocates benefits and costs, it does not make
sense to cut back unilaterally.”160
It may be argued that state races to the bottom are the circumstances
under which the federal government is allowed to act under its Commerce
Clause authority.161 Federal involvement in natural resource appropriation
can provide a mechanism to coordinate the actions of rational state
governments in a way that prevents the destructive effects of states as
herders on the national commons.162 Even so, the federal government’s
current statutes aimed at natural capital only affect land use activities under
fairly limited circumstances—such as in the presence of an endangered
species or wetlands considered “navigable waters” of the United States.163
These statutes only have tangential impacts on powers traditionally
reserved to the states under the Constitution and are not aimed at direct
land use regulation such as zoning and other urban planning activities. In
short, although race to the bottom has been invoked by our own Supreme
Court as justification for federal regulation under the Commerce Clause,164
the federal government has never been found to have such an authority in
the land use planning context. This constitutional state of affairs supports
the exploration of more creative approaches that facilitate greater
coordination of land use decisions at the state and local level.
Ultimately, the national natural capital present across the United States
takes on the characteristics of a commons when rational state governments
fail to utilize their regulatory authority over land use and allow unchecked
appropriation of resources of interest to the nation as a whole.165 In states
160.
Daniels, supra note 5, at 910.
161.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has explicitly invoked a commons
analysis when discussing the race to the bottom among states in the context of water resources, stating:
[T]he primary purpose of the effluent limitations and guidelines [of the Clean Water Act]
was to provide uniformity among the federal and state jurisdictions enforcing the [National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System] program and prevent the “Tragedy of the
Commons” that might result if jurisdictions can compete for industry and development by
providing more liberal limitations than their neighboring states.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted).
162.
Ostrom established that “appropriators engage in a considerable amount of trial-and-error
learning. Many actions are selected without full knowledge of their consequences.” OSTROM, supra
note 25, at 34. This is the very reason for the passage of federal environmental statutes. The fifty states
have been described as laboratories of experimentation for law, and some run better trials and have
fewer errors than others. Thus the federal government seeks to regulate the environment in areas in
desperate need of coordination in order to rectify individual appropriators’ (i.e. states’) errors in
management.
163.
See cases cited supra note 109.
164.
See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264, 281–82 (1981), and
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 328–29 (1981).
165.
Scholars have noted that states take on the characteristics of rational herders in other
contexts. Brigham Daniels argues that the perpetual moving up of presidential primary dates by states
constitutes a classic tragedy of the commons, resulting in damage to the electoral system. See generally
Daniels, supra note 5.
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that decline to intervene in natural capital appropriation, the state
boundaries do not act as a sufficient “fence” around each rational state
government’s resource unit of natural capital in a way that encourages the
state to adequately protect the natural resources within its borders. In the
absence of federal inputs into natural capital appropriation by subnational
entities, either through cooperative federalism arrangements with state
governments or pursuant to constitutional regulatory authority based upon
the Commerce Clause or some other enumerated power, states may remain
rational herders appropriating natural capital from the national commons
with potentially tragic consequences. Not only might this state rationality
inhibit protection of the national natural capital commons, but it also may
establish yet another commons higher up the scale, complicating and
potentially inhibiting national participation in managing the global natural
capital commons via legally binding international agreements.
C. The Global Commons: Natural Capital Appropriated by Nations
A global-level natural capital commons exists when: (1) national
governments politically refrain from utilizing their legal authority to
intervene in subnational appropriation of natural capital within their
borders, or more importantly are constitutionally constrained from doing
so; and (2) their political or constitutional rationality renders the
international community unable to create a treaty or other global
governance regime166 to coordinate national action on natural capital
appropriation. The entity that takes on the characteristics of a rational
herder in this instance is the nation, and the scale of the resource system is
broadened to the natural capital on the globe. This scaling up from local, to
national, to global natural capital commons is informative because, as
noted by Duncan Snidal, “[l]ocal [commons] and [international relations]
have exploitable similarities because both involve collective-action
problems, broadly defined, where independent behavior leads to
collectively suboptimal outcomes.”167 As seen with private property owners
and states in the previous Parts, national failure to act and lack of
international input into national policies, either through global governance
regimes or cooperative collaborative efforts among distinct groups of
nations, renders the depletable natural capital in the global resource system
non-excludable because no nation can be excluded from allowing

166.
A global governance regime is here defined to mean “principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.” Stephen D.
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L
ORG. 185, 185 (1982).
167.
Snidal, supra note 22, at 49.
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unchecked appropriation of the resource unit of natural capital within each
nation’s boundaries.
Before analyzing the global commons, two important qualifications to
the premises put forth should be discussed. First, whether global
environmental governance, including climate governance, via a legally
binding international treaty that details prescriptive targets is necessary or
desirable is not certain. Scholars have highlighted a recent trend toward
bottom-up and flexible transnational approaches to engaging in global
environmental governance in the absence of a centralized, legally binding
international arrangement.168 Even so, these arrangements have arisen
largely because of a failure to create a legally binding agreement—a failure
due not only to political complications and sovereignty concerns but also
arguably because of the structure of the domestic legal frameworks from
which federal nations approach international negotiations. In these systems
legal perception is often political reality as national governments politically
refuse to enter into certain international agreements based upon the
perception that they do not legally maintain that authority.169 To the extent
that nations value the ability to enter into legally binding arrangements,
however, the complications posed by federal systems in the global
commons need to be addressed.
Second, even in the presence of an international treaty or other regime,
the global commons is somewhat distinct from the state and national
commons. National and subnational constitutional authority is more readily
enforceable than are international agreements—the double-sided coin of
sovereignty grants nations legitimacy when enforcing domestic policy
while at the same time working against the legitimacy of the international
community when enforcing global policies. In addition, “[e]ven if we could
establish world government—or a pocket of strong centralized authority
over some aspect of international affairs—we could not solve such
complex problems simply by . . . rules and laws.”170 Despite the “recurrent
criticism of both international relations and international law . . . that
effective enforcement is virtually impossible because there is no routinized
sanctioning mechanism,” however, “equally striking is the observation that
international agreements work more often than they do not.”171
Furthermore, even though the operation of legal enforcement within the
168.
See Kenneth Abbott, The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change (Soc. Sci.
Research Network, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1813198; Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N.
Climate Change Regime (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773865.
169.
See Hudson, supra note 92.
170.
Snidal, supra note 22, at 68.
171.
BUCK, supra note 55, at 31.

3 HUDSON 1007-1065 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

9/4/2012 10:30 AM

Federal Constitutions

1055

global commons is distinct from that in the state and national commons, in
the absence of rules governing natural capital appropriation, all three
commons operate very much the same. Commons scholarship
acknowledges that “[s]trong analogies exist between decentralized patterns
of cooperation on the local level and patterns of international cooperation,
where no external enforcement agency is generally available.”172 In other
words, in the absence of external rules or internal cooperation, private
individuals appropriating natural capital on the state commons and states
facilitating natural capital appropriation on the national commons operate
exactly like an international system of nations without a higher external
authority or a set of internal agreements coordinating their action.
The goal of this part, however, is not to compare the desirability or
efficacy of international law in actually influencing domestic law, as that
depends on a variety of variables from political will to actual enforcement
capacity of law on the books. Rather, this part merely describes the
operation of the international community as yet a higher level, and
potentially legally entrenched, natural capital commons, especially relevant
in the context of federal systems of government. This exercise is
particularly useful given that certain international environmental
agreements have been effective in curbing individual nation rationality in
the past (and present), as with the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer, hailed as “[p]erhaps the single most successful
international agreement to date . . . .”173
With natural capital stock and ecosystem service values worldwide
estimated at an average of $33 trillion per year, less than two hundred
individual and potentially rational nations determine the fate of copious
quantities of valuable natural resources. What is more, the 13% of the
world’s governments that are federal, and that potentially legally entrench
the nested commons described in this Article, control 47% of the world’s
land base and 70%–80% of the world’s forests, just to name one important
class of natural capital.174 In fact, the international community itself may be
172.
Lisa L. Martin, Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems, in LOCAL COMMONS AND
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 72, 88 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995).
173.
International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/events/ozoneday/background.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). Indeed, Salzman
et al. note that,
[t]o many observers, the traditional non-participatory, consensus-based nature of the
international law system has been a major hindrance to efforts to formulate an effective
international response to our global environmental crisis, where States are held accountable
under the rule of law. Increasingly, however, the limitations inherent in international law are
being challenged. As non-State actors and new processes emerge in the international system,
international lawmaking is slowly and inevitably developing some of the more robust
characteristics of national legal systems.
HUNTER, supra note 52, at 274.
174.
Contreras-Hermosilla, supra note 83.
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characterized as a federal governance system, since the only hegemonic
“authority” over decentralized governance of issues of global concern is an
agreement among nations—there is no sovereign global government to
create a unitary global governance system.175 As a result, a federation of
nations is the construct within which the international community must
operate. In the absence of agreement, individually rational nations may
often seek to maximize their own economic well-being by appropriating
natural capital to the detriment of the global commons.176
Commons scholars have noted how the very systems of government
that negotiate natural capital agreements can take on the characteristics of a
commons as “the social structures that bound and define resource commons
share the fundamental characteristics of commons themselves.”177 In the
context of fisheries, scholars have noted that “[t]he creation of a new
institution itself is indeed a form of collective action” and that some fishery
collapses were due to a tragedy of the commons not just regarding the
resource itself, but “in the very legal/political processes that were supposed
to counteract such problems. Too many government bodies competed with
each other for political resources for any of them to account meaningfully
for such diffuse, intangible, or transgenerational values as were really at
stake . . . .”178
Forests provide another example of how the governmental institutions
that manage natural capital entrench the global commons described in this
part. Scholars are increasingly recognizing the crucial role that forests play
in climate regulation. Most of the 20%–25% of carbon emissions resulting
yearly from land use changes occur due to forest destruction and
degradation—more than emitted by the transportation sector each year.179
Despite inertia among policy-makers toward including global forest
management within some type of post-Kyoto climate regime,180 the
international community has failed to enter into a broad-based agreement to
175.
See Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 22, at 11 (stating that “[w]ithin states, effective
hierarchy would be exercised, while in international relations no common government exists”).
176.
See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
177.
Michel Gelobter, Integrating Scale and Social Justice in the Commons, in PROTECTING THE
COMMONS, supra note 9, at 293.
178.
Id. at 293–94. Application of commons analysis to federal systems of government seems
more appropriate considering that “the idea that the social world exhibits some of the characteristics of
commons is a recurring theme in the social sciences.” Id. at 294. Gelobter further notes that “[t]he
democratic state itself, in traditional Western political thought, is no more or less than the collective
pool of individual wills that supplanted the monarch in whom sovereignty previously resided.” Id. If
democratic states are thus, how much more so federal democratic governments?
179.
See ERIN C. MYERS MADEIRA, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS
FROM DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION (REDD) IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE ISSUES FACING THE INCORPORATION OF REDD INTO MARKET-BASED CLIMATE POLICIES 20 fig.2.2
(2008), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-rpt-redd_final.2.20.09.pdf.
180.
See supra note 82.
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do so. Developing countries argue that they should not have to limit the
destruction of forest resources in order to curb atmospheric carbon levels,
thus foregoing their individual economic development—especially when
the developed world achieved its developed status by undertaking similar
resource appropriation and are currently responsible for a vast majority of
carbon emissions worldwide.181
Thus individually rational nations appropriate resource units of natural
capital from the global resource system unchecked by internal or external
rules—resource units that are essential to the preservation of global goods,
as is the case with the quickly disappearing Amazonian Rainforest and its
provision of both global biodiversity and climate regulation services.
Indeed, the destruction of tropical and subtropical forests, and the
atmospheric regulation services they provide, is because “nations acting in
their own self-interest have inadvertently threatened the well-being of a
larger community by harming the atmosphere’s ability to provide its
services.”182
As demonstrated by the divide between developed and developing
countries, many national governments may politically refrain from utilizing
their authority to intervene in subnational appropriation of natural capital
within their borders and may also refuse to enter international agreements
to do so. Exercise of this political rationality is not unique to either unitary
or federal systems, as each governmental system may be equally likely to
take this approach. Exercise of legal rationality, however, may result in
stark differences between unitary and federal systems of government. Due
to the constitutional split in national and subnational regulatory authority
discussed in prior Parts, certain federal nations may be legally constrained
from acting domestically, which also renders their participation in certain
international agreements at the least difficult and at the most impossible.
Again, forests are instructive on this point. Recent research
demonstrates that certain federal systems of government maintain
governance structures that inhibit their ability to enter into certain types of
international treaty or global governance regimes related to forests—
specifically international agreements that would legally bind nations to

181.
Martha E. Geores, The Relationship Between Resource Definition and Scale: Considering
the Forest, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 77, 92–93 (Nives Dolsak & Elinor Ostrom
eds., 2003). The developing world has viewed a global forest treaty as a means for the developed world
to raise trade barriers and to engage in “forest colonialism” by obligating the developing world to take
economically detrimental action to protect tropical forests while refusing to enforce the same
regulations on temperate and boreal forests. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Knowledge, Power, and Interests in
Environmental Regime Formation, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 123, 135 (2003).
182.
John Harrison & Pamela Matson, The Atmospheric Commons, in PROTECTING THE
COMMONS 219, 220 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001). Harrison and Matson further analogized these
nations’ actions with the actions taken by individuals in Hardin’s commons. Id. at 220–21.
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specific forest management practices.183 In the case of countries like Brazil
and Russia, these constraints are political in nature and arise out of an
inability to enforce domestic policy, rendering participation in international
rulemaking for natural capital management of little consequence.184 Other
nations, like the United States and Canada, however, are legally
constrained by constitutional grants of primary forest management
regulatory authority to subnational governments.185 In other words, the
state (or provincial, in the case of Canada) and national commons described
above provide the foundation for, and are nested within, the global natural
capital commons. Despite the fact that constitutional decentralization of
forest policy in these systems provides a variety of governance benefits for
local resource managers,186 the legal incapacity of the national government
to guide subnational forest management policies effectively precludes
participation in certain types of international agreements related to forests.
Ultimately, the United States national government’s lack of direct
inputs into land use decisions by local governments, not only in the context
of private forest management but also with regard to agricultural practices
and the appropriation of other natural capital pursuant to economic
development activities, among other examples, may have profound impacts
around the globe. Changes in land use associated with forestry, agriculture
and economic development accounted for nearly 40% of the carbon fluxes
from 1850 to 1980.187 When countries like the United States exercise legal,
or constitutional, rationality by leaving land use regulatory authority
exclusively with subnational governments, they legally preclude
participation in certain types of international agreements. Thus federal
systems add a layer of legal rationality to the plentitude of political
rationality that pervades the international community related to global
natural capital governance. With individual nations exercising this legal
and political rationality, their resulting failure to coordinate renders global
environmental governance the highest level natural capital commons.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL SYSTEM NATURAL CAPITAL
GOVERNANCE: TRAGEDY NOT INEVITABLE, BUT LEGALLY DEFENSIBLE
As noted by commons scholars, “[i]t is popularly believed that the
actors involved in [commons] problems, whether individuals or

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See Hudson, supra note 92.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 71.
Joanna Burger, Richard B. Norgaard & Elinor Ostrom, Conclusion, in PROTECTING THE
COMMONS, supra note 9, at 220.
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governments, are trapped in an inexorable ‘tragedy of the commons’ from
which they cannot extract themselves.”188 Ostrom herself criticizes much of
the body of commons scholarship as regretfully presuming a “remorseless
tragedy.”189 Ostrom and other scholars have more recently proven this
theory of inexorability wrong, as evidenced by Ostrom’s successful
collective action model.
Indeed, on the state commons individual private property owners
sometimes harness the power of private property to protect the
environment.190 Due largely to the difficulties nations have experienced in
forging a legally binding international climate agreement, local
communities and non-governmental organizations are even devising their
own methods for addressing climate change.191 Even in the absence of a
higher mandate, these individuals and groups are overcoming individual
rationality and seeking to escape natural capital tragedies, demonstrating
that external rules are not a necessary component to spur certain
individuals to action.
Nor do state governments necessarily rush toward tragedy on the
national commons. States such as California have led the charge on
ratcheting up certain mechanisms of environmental protection, even
maintaining more stringent environmental regulations than the national
government—a phenomenon of race-to-the-top known as the “California
Effect.”192 Furthermore, in the absence of global or national action to
reduce carbon emissions, California passed and is currently in the process
of implementing the Global Warming Solutions Act, commonly referred to
as “A.B. 32.”193 In this way state governments in the United States may
often serve as valuable laboratories for governmental experimentation,
rather than racing to the bottom. Similarly, states have engaged in
horizontal, collective-action approaches to address environmental issues,
whereby subnational governments have agreed with other subnational
governments to manage the environment even in the absence of a top-down
mandate. For example, regional coalitions of United States and Canadian
provinces have decided to tackle climate change by establishing a carbon

188.
Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 22, at 1.
189.
OSTROM, supra note 25, at 7.
190.
See supra notes 114–115.
191.
Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental
Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 87 (2012).
192.
David Vogel, Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and
Environmental Protection, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 556 (1997).
193.
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, §§ 1–2, 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv.
Ch. 488 (A.B. 32) (West).
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credit cap-and-trade in the absence of their respective federal governments’
political will to do so.194
On the global commons, some nations effectively manage certain types
of natural capital even in the absence of national-level inputs. Canadian
forests provide an example. Despite explicit constitutional provisions
granting the provinces exclusive regulatory authority over forests in
Canada,195 its provinces manage those forests with some of the most
involved regulatory protections in the world196—almost entirely devoid of
inputs by the national government. These protections are in stark contrast
to the United States, where many states maintain extremely weak
regulatory mechanisms.197 Even in the United States, however, forest
management is far superior to that in many developing countries, such as
Indonesia and Brazil, which continue to oversee precipitous declines in
their respective tropical forest cover.
Even though there are examples of parties extracting themselves from
commons tragedies at each level within nested natural capital commons,
there is an important difference between inexorability, probability, and
reality. Though not inevitably trapped, in reality most private property
owners and states remain both uninformed about the value of natural
capital and guided by economic incentives diametrically opposed to
sustainable natural capital management—policies that exacerbate urban
sprawl and other environmental ills within nations. Likewise, nations are
facilitating the destruction of global resources, like tropical forests, world
fisheries, and a global atmosphere free of dangerous levels of greenhouse
gases, to name only a few examples. Certain federal constitutional
structures make these realities more probable, rather than inexorable. At the
very least, the above examples of actors overcoming commons tragedies
demonstrate that while a few are successful, many more are unsuccessful,
indicating that some legal inputs either at a higher level or horizontally
among actors are necessary to coordinate successful action. In the absence
of such authority, a natural capital tragedy remains legally defensible.
Those federal systems that grant exclusive constitutional control over
certain categories of natural capital appropriation for numerous and
194.
Examples include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont), the
Midwestern Regional GHG Reduction Accord (Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin, and the Canadian province of Manitoba), and the Western Climate Initiative (Arizona,
California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, and the Canadian provinces of
British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec). See North American Cap-and-Trade Initiatives,
PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_
states/NA-capandtrade (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
195.
See Hudson, supra note 92.
196.
See Siry et al., supra note 15.
197.
Id.
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independent subnational governments increase the likelihood of legally
defensible natural capital tragedies. In other words, the potential
complications that federal systems of government can create for natural
capital governance across local, national, and international scales are not an
inevitable result of that form of governance structure, but federal structure
simply adds a layer of legal complication on top of already politically
complicated resource management. While it is not impossible for the varied
actors within federal systems to extract themselves from tragic natural
capital appropriation, it is far more difficult to coordinate and ensure efforts
to do so. Certainly attempts at cooperative or voluntary inputs may be made
by national governments in these systems, but in the event that these fail
there is no legal mechanism—no “Fail-Safe Federalism”198—for preventing
subnational natural capital tragedies.
Again, contrast national-level natural capital management in unitary
systems of government with that in federal systems. Unitary action at the
national level may be politically thwarted by subnational interest groups or
powerful subnational government influence, but legally unitary
governments maintain the authority to act once they politically choose to
do so. In federal systems, even if the national government politically
chooses to act, it only takes one private property owner or one subnational
government combined with the right mix of judges or Supreme Court
justices to have national action thwarted by constitutional challenge. As
noted above, legal perception in federal systems is often political reality, as
national governments politically refuse to attempt certain types of natural
capital appropriation based upon the legal perception that they do not
maintain such authority.
Ultimately, nested natural capital commons in federal systems of
government should be further assessed to help us understand the
appropriate balance between government intervention and private property
rights in managing natural capital across scales. For example, given the
commons complications federal systems pose, it would be interesting to
explore how Ostrom’s successful collective action models could be applied
to both subnational governments and private individuals in the context of
natural capital appropriation. Such study may provide insights into how
private individuals and subnational governments could provide successful
natural capital management mechanisms outside of top-down, prescriptive
governmental involvement. Indeed, this Article is not calling for a dramatic
tip in the balance toward top-down, prescriptive nationalization of land use
or private forest management, especially since “[g]overnment policies that
have ignored the local knowledge of participants or underestimated their

198.

See Hudson, supra note 72.
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ability to solve collective-action problems have done great damage.”199 But
so too have government policies and governance structures that have relied
too heavily on local knowledge of participants or overestimated their
ability to solve collective action problems.200 The latter is often the case in
federal systems that provide no constitutional mechanism for allowing
national-level inputs into subnational rules for natural capital appropriation.
Leaving this keystone out of the arch of federal nation natural capital
governance can cause the arch of natural capital management, stretching
across local, national, and global scales, to crumble.
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: FORTIFYING KEYSTONE CONSTITUTIONS
National governments in federal systems of government have the
ability, if granted constitutional authority, to address the nested commons
described in this Article. National governments that have regulatory
authority to address land use issues related to urban development or private
forest management can spur subnational governments to craft rules for
natural capital appropriation by private entities, or can do so directly in the
absence of state action to protect the natural capital of the nation as a
whole. In turn, national governments unconstrained by lower-level
commons are freer, from a legal perspective, to enter into international
treaties or other governance regimes addressing global natural capital
commons problems. Though these federal systems may be politically
bounded by their own rationality regarding whether to coordinate
internationally to manage the global commons, since there is no global
hegemonic entity to direct them in the same way that they may direct
subnational governments, they are no longer legally bound to rational
commons outcomes.
The United States, on the other hand, presents the case of a federal
system that legally entrenches all three commons with regard to certain
types of natural capital. If subnational governments fail to act in restraining
destructive private actor appropriation of natural capital on the state
commons, the national government arguably does not maintain the
authority to intervene, which also legally entrenches the national commons
as the national government cannot coordinate state action. Finally, legal
entrenchment of the global commons becomes more likely. United States
participation, for example, has been viewed by some as crucial to the
success of any global environmental treaty, so its inability to participate in
199.
Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 22, at 21.
200.
With regard to the latter, local failure to solve collective action problems is hardly
surprising, considering the perverse incentives created by society and government for metrics of
economic growth and prosperity.
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international arrangements that utilize forest management to combat
climate change may make more probable an entrenchment of a global
forest commons. In the absence of international rules, it is exceedingly
difficult to exclude each nation from rationally appropriating depletable
forest resources for its economic benefit to the detriment of the global
community. Understanding the crucial role of federal governments along
the nested commons continuum is crucial to establishing sufficient legal
frameworks for managing natural capital across scales, from local, to
national, to global. Federal constitutions act as a keystone to these
management scales, either allowing or legally denying coordinated efforts.
Constitutions like the U.S. Constitution can be fortified in a number of
ways in order to prevent federal nested commons tragedies. Most obvious
is direct and explicit fortification via the passage of a constitutional
amendment that allows national government involvement in setting rules
for subnational appropriation of natural capital.201 Another direct approach
is the passage of statutes by the national legislative branch to test the waters
of judicial interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. If such an act is found by
the courts to be constitutional, then the national government would achieve
coordinating authority. The former approach is exceedingly difficult,
though not impossible, while the latter approach may be politically
untenable if it raises fears that United States federalism would be rendered
meaningless from a regulatory authority standpoint. Certain types of
natural capital regulation, such as private forest management and land use
activities that appropriate resources, fall more squarely within the category
of a direct land use activity traditionally regulated by state and local
governments. There is no doubt value to this sort of decentralized
governance, which certainly should not be eviscerated.202 On the other
hand, it seems likely that some form of federal fail-safe to coordinate state
action that has destructive effects on the nation as a whole would be
constitutional.203 Where exactly on the continuum that fail-safe lies should
be further explored given the new context of federal nested commons.
Ultimately, a top-down regulatory framework arising out of expanded
national constitutional authority is not a necessary or inevitably preferable
solution to provide adequate natural capital management across scales.
Other approaches should also be considered.

201.
See Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy
Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013 (2004); Dan Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A Constitutional
Amendment to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and Promote the Environment, 32 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 821 (2005). But see J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed
Environmental Quality Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (1999).
202.
See supra note 71.
203.
See supra note 62.
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A second approach is the aforementioned horizontal approach,
whereby subnational governments agree with other subnational
governments to take collective action to address natural capital
management in the absence of a top-down mandate. An example, noted in
part IV. above, would be groups of states establishing a carbon cap-andtrade scheme to combat climate change in the absence of federal political
will to do so.204 Perhaps states can band together to create regional forest
management plans or regional land use plans, whereby each state agrees to
pass legislation achieving minimum forest management or land use
standards and can thus avoid the entrenched incentives to race to the
bottom. This approach would render the fail-safe role of the national
government unnecessary and also gives the national government de facto, if
not legal, flexibility during international negotiations because the states
would have already voluntarily bound themselves to a position that does
not restrain the national government in international negotiations, but that
rather reinforces the goals of the global governance regime.
The third method of strengthening constitutional structure is a bilateral
approach, whereby subnational government interests are taken into account
when the national government crafts voluntary and incentive-based
programs to encourage subnational action on natural capital management.
Bilateral approaches can take two forms, cooperative or uncooperative.
Cooperative federalism205 might involve the national government
establishing minimum land use or forest management standards to which
subnational governments can voluntarily bind themselves while at the same
time receiving “carrots” in the form of subsidies (or other forms of
funding), authority to dictate policy over which they would not ordinarily
have authority (a ceding of federal authority over certain matters), or some
other incentive.206 “Uncooperative federalism” might involve the national
government refusing to fund projects within subnational jurisdictions, such
as withholding highway funds or refusing to provide some other
entitlement that subnational governments normally receive. Thus, the

204.
See supra note 194.
205.
“Cooperative federalism” is here used in the bilateral sense, rather than the top-down sense.
To explain, many prescriptive, top-down environmental statutes adopt a form of cooperative federalism
which allows the states a degree of control over implementing the statute (such as the Clean Water Act,
the Clean Air Act, etc.). It remains, however, that the states must comply—the prescriptions states are
implementing remain mandatory. Here, “bilateral cooperative federalism” is that where the federal
government provides a prescriptive framework and incentives for participation, while allowing states to
voluntarily opt into the program. Though the framework may require compliance once applicable, it
also provides financial assistance and allows decentralized implementation. The Coastal Zone
Management Act operates in this fashion.
206.
See Rule, supra note 126, at 318–19 (arguing for green community tax credits for small
wind and solar projects).

3 HUDSON 1007-1065 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

9/4/2012 10:30 AM

Federal Constitutions

1065

national government would “encourage” states to develop minimum natural
capital management standards.
In the final assessment, analysis of constitutionally entrenched natural
capital commons created by federal systems of government is important
and allows us to better understand how keystone constitutions can be
fortified to address natural capital commons tragedies across scales.
Advanced understandings of new commons, like federal nested commons,
“put[s] us in a better position to facilitate the development of commons
institutions in the future,” because “in the absence of appropriate
institutions, it is in the individual’s best interest to take as much as possible
as soon as possible, damaging the resource further in his or her greed and
haste.”207 Federal systems and their constitutions are institutional
mechanisms for managing natural capital commons, and so their study will
result in increased understandings of how governmental systems do not
“become the commons,” but rather how they can operate in balance with
private property rights and successful collective action arrangements to
address commons tragedies.

207.

Burger et al., supra note 10, at 2.

